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A STATE'S TAX JURISDICTION AS LIMITED BY
THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION*
VERNON W. CLARK"

The judicial establishment of the limits of a state's tax jurisdiction as dictated by the Federal Constitution has been of concern to
the United States Supreme Court for many years.' An adequate understanding of the present state of the law in this troublesome field
necessitates tracing the development of the principles governing this
jurisdiction as pronounced by the Court.
The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution sets the requirements for establishment of
a state's jurisdiction to tax. 2 In construing this provision the Court
has experienced no difficulty in arriving at the conclusion that the
constitutional right to tax persons,3 property,4 and the exercise of
privileges5 requires the subject or incidence of the tax to be within
the territorial limits of the taxing unit. The terminology often used
to express this requirement is in terms of situs. The establishment of
a tax situs by the subject matter is a prerequisite to the imposition
6

of a valid tax.

The due process justification for the necessity of the presence of
the subject of the tax is found in the fact that a tax is considered
*A table of headings and subheadings is appended at the end of this article.
**A.B.E. 1932, University of Florida; M.A. 1939, New York University; LL.B.
1942, University of Florida; Professor of Law, University of Florida.
'See, e.g., Treichler v. Wisconsin, 338 U.S. 251 (1949); Hays v. Pacific Mail S.S.
Co., 58 U.s. (17 How.) 596 (1854).
2Braniff Airways v. Nebraska State Bd., 347 U.S. 590 (1954); Union Refrigerator
Transit Co. v. Kentucky, 199 U.S. 194 (1905). The problem was dealt with on
common law principles before the adoption of the amendment. Hays v. Pacific
Mail S.S. Co., supra note 1.
3Haavik v. Alaska Packers Ass'n, 263 U.S. 510 (1924).
4Pullman's Palace Car Co. v. Pennsylvania, 141 U.S. 18 (1891).
5McLeod v. J. E. Dilworth Co., 322 U.S. 327 (1944); St. Louis Cotton Compress
Co. v. Arkansas, 260 U.S. 346 (1922); Frick v. Pennsylvania, 268 U.S. 473 (1925).
6E.g., Frick v. Pennsylvania, supra note 5; Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v.
Kentucky, 199 U.S. 194 (1905).
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to be a return for opportunities, benefits, or protection afforded the
subject by the laws of the taxing state. 7 These advantages cannot
8
accrue to the subject unless it is considered to be within the state.
9
At times, it must be admitted, the Court has employed a fiction in
order to meet the requirement; yet its validity remains unaffected.
Many cases presented to the Court have concerned the question
of taxability of property in interstate commerce.' 0 Thus the commerce clause of the United States Constitution" enters the picture.
The Court's construction of this clause in some instances has so
closely associated its requirements with those of the due process
clause 12 that a treatment of the commerce clause as it is related to
jurisdiction to tax will be included in this study.
A state's jurisdiction to tax must be accepted in proper perspective. The mere fact that the Court has recognized that jurisdiction to tax exists because certain requirements of due process have
been satisfied does not mean that there is no other objection that can
be based on lack of due process s or that there is no other federal
constitutional objection to the tax. As previously intimated, the
commerce clause possibly may be a stumbling block to the validity
of a tax.' 4 Additional constitutional hazards to the determination of
the validity of a tax are the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment, 5 which prohibits a state from denying to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws; the exportimport clause, which prohibits a state from taxing imports or exports
without the consent of Congress except to the extent necessary for
executing its inspection laws;" the privileges and immunities clause,
7Curry v. McCanless, 307 U.S. 357 (1939); Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v.
Kentucky, supra note 6.
sStandard Oil Co. v. Peck, 342 U.S. 382 (1952).
9E.g., Blodgett v. Silberman, 277 U.S. 1 (1928).
1OE.g., Ott v. Mississippi Valley Barge Line Co., 336 U.S. 169 (1949); Northwest
Airlines, Inc. v. Minnesota, 322 U.S. 292 (1944).
"1U.S. CONsT. art. I, §8, cl. 3. The Congress shall have power "to regulate
commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States, and with the
Indian tribes."
12E.g., Pullman's Palace Car Co. v. Pennsylvania, 141 U.S. 18 (1891); see Pt. I1
infra, subheading "(b). Commodities."
"3E.g., Turner v. Wade, 254 U.S. 64 (1920) (assessment procedures).
'4Michigan-Wisconsin Pipe Line Co. v. Calvert, 347 U.S. 157 (1954).
"5U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §1; see Quaker City Cab Co. v. Pennsylvania, 277
U.S. 389 (1928), for an example of the violation of this clause.
16U.S. CONsT. art. 1, §10, ci. 2; Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419
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which prohibits a state from making or enforcing any law that
abridges the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; 17
the impairment of contract provision, which prohibits any state from
passing a law impairing the obligation of contract;' 8 and the operadon of the principles of intergovernmental immunity, which protect
federal instrumentalities from state taxation. 9 Since these provisions
are not concerned with jurisdiction as such, they are not discussed
in this article. Their demands are of an indispensable character,
however, and must be treated with deference in appropriate cases.
This fact should not detract from the importance of the present
study of the ramifications of due process, which probably outnumber
those of most, if not all, of the other constitutional restrictions on
a state's power to tax.
At the outset, a distinction should be drawn between a state's
jurisdiction to tax and its exercise of such jurisdiction. There may
be no constitutional objection to the imposition of a tax; yet the
state may not see fit to exercise this power. Consequently, jurisdic20
tion to tax may exist even in the absence of an actual tax.
The final distinction to be noted is that between jurisdiction to
tax and the amount of the tax. If the subject is taxable by virtue
of its presence in the state, the jurisdiction to tax is not nullified
because the tax is burdensome in amount.2' The Court, while not
deviating from this principle, has rendered one decision that invalidated a state tax merely because it was considered excessive in
amount. In Great Northern R.R. v. Weeks, 22 decided in 1936, a tax
based on a grossly excessive assessment of property within the territorial limits of the state was held to violate the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment. Significantly, however, the decision
was based on the onerous aspect of the amount of the tax rather than
on lack of jurisdiction to tax.
(1827).
irToomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948). Interesting state cases on this point
are O'Connell v. Kontojohn, 131 Fla. 783, 179 So. 802 (1938); Grantham v. City
of Chickasha, 156 Okla. 56, 9 P.2d 747 (1932).
'1su.S. CONST. art. I, §10, ci. 1. See, e.g., Puerto Rico v. Russell & Co., 315 U.S.
610 (1942).
'9E.g., Rohr Aircraft Corp. v. County of San Diego, 80 Sup. Ct. 1050 (1960).
20Dameron v. Brodhead, 345 U.S. 322 (1953).
21Magnano Co. v. Hamilton, 292 U.S. 40 (1934); Alaska Fish Salting & Byproducts Co. v. Smith, 255 U.S. 44 (1921); McCray v. United States, 195 U.S. 27
(1904).
22297 U.S. 135.
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Four years later, in Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Browning,23 the
distinction between the amount of the tax and the jurisdiction to
tax was made more obvious. The Court sapped the strength of the
Weeks case by reaching a contrary decision with reference to a
similar set of facts. This and similar decisions should not be interpreted to mean that a state is under no restrictions as to the amount
of the tax. The due process provision places no limitation on the
amount of a constitutionally imposed tax, but if the form of taxation
is utilized as a mere disguise for the exercise of another constitutionally forbidden power, such as confiscation, the exaction cannot
24
stand.
PART I.

REAL PROPERTY

The United States Supreme Court has never entertained a case
in which a state attempted to tax directly land located in another
state. 25 On numerous occasions its dicta and analogies have been
stated so clearly that there is little room to doubt its position with
reference to this type of situation.26 Land, the Court has said, is
taxable only by the jurisdiction in which it is located; this principle
is so elementary that no state legislature has assumed to impose a tax
contrary to it. 27 Accordingly, taxability at the situs of the land does
not depend upon the citizenship or domicile of the owner.2 8
Even though the Court has faced no problem involving the direct
taxation of foreign land by a state, it has had to determine whether
such taxation has been accomplished by indirect means. In Senior
v. Braden,29 decided in 1935, Ohio levied what purported to be a
personal property tax on land trust certificates representing a domiciliary taxpayer's beneficial interest in foreign land, the legal title
to which was held by an out-of-state trustee. The trustee was to hold
and manage the realty for the benefit of the certificate holders and
23310 U.S. 362 (1940).
24Magnano v. Hamilton, supra note 21; Alaska Fish Salting & By-products Co.
v. Smith, supra note 21.
25See Miller Bros. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340, n.11 (1954). A careful search of
cases decided subsequent to the Miller decision warrants no change in this statement.
26E.g., S. R. A., Inc. v. Minnesota, 327 U.S. 558 (1946); Union Refrigerator
Transit Co. v. Kentucky, infra note 27.
27See Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky, 199 U.S. 194 (1905).
2SMiller Bros. Co. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340, 345 (1954) (dictum).
29295 U.S. 422.
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to distribute the income or sale proceeds to them. The state conceded
that if the tax were assessed against "land or interests in land" it
would be unconstitutional. The Court held that the certificates represented interests in land and struck down the Ohio tax as violating
the due process clause.
In the famous case of Blodgett v. Silberman"° the value of land
outside the taxing jurisdiction played an important role in the computation of a valid tax within the jurisdiction. A general partner's
interest in a New York limited partnership that owned, inter alia,
lands and buildings in New York was considered to be intangible
personal property, subject to a death tax at the domicile of the decedent general partner in Connecticut. This holding was based upon
the reasoning that the decedent's interest under the New York statute
and the partnership agreement was only the right to share in the
remains of the partnership assets after its liabilities were satisfied; it
was not an interest in land or other specific assets. Consequently, the
land and buildings were deemed converted into intangible personalty.
Since intangible personalty is subject to a death tax at the domicile of
the decedent owner, the value of the partnership interest, which included part of the value of the land and buildings, was properly
included in computing the Connecticut death tax. Implicit in the
opinion is the recognition of Connecticut's inability to impose a tax
on, or with reference to, land outside its own boundaries.
The five-to-four decision in Maxwell v. Bugbee3' dealt with an
even more interesting, and certainly more controversial, situation
involving foreign land in a local tax situation. An inheritance tax
statute provided for a tax on the transfer of property in the state.
The rate of the tax was graduated in accordance with the value of
decedent's entire estate regardless of location. The estate included
land and other property located outside the state. The majority of
the Court approved the exaction, saying that the subject matter of
the tax was the privilege to succeed to property within the jurisdiction.
Since this was true, no objection was found to the state's use of the
value of the property outside the jurisdiction in computing the taxation rate to be applied, unless the inclusion of this out-of-state
property, with the resultant increased rate, would make the tax
amount to one on property beyond its jurisdiction. The dissenting
justices were convinced that if the use of foreign property in com30277 U.S. 1 (1928).
31250 U.S. 525 (1919).
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puting the rate of tax on a local privilege resulted in a higher tax
than would result from exclusion of the out-of-state property, the
foreign property was taxed unconstitutionally.32 This position is
difficult to criticize, but it does not represent the present law as long
as the limitations specified by the majority are observed.
Although the Court has adhered strictly to the elementary principle that land is taxable only where it is located, jurisdictional problems still arise. An illustration is found in Savings & Loan Society v.
Multnomah County.33 A domiciliary of California held a mortgage

on land located in Oregon. Oregon sought to tax the mortgage interest as an interest in land within its jurisdiction. The tax was upheld
against the contention that the tax statute violated the due process
of law clause. The Court stated that the mortgage, regardless of
whether it was a mere lien on the land or carried title, represented a
taxable interest in the Oregon land and owed its existence, maintenance, and enforcement to the law of that state. Alternative procedures were available to the legislature in considering the mortgage
interest when formulating the tax statute. It could have treated a
mortgage debt as personal property, taxable at the domicile of the
creditor like other choses in action, or as an interest in real property,
taxable at the situs like other real property. Oregon chose to tax
the interest as real property.
At this point the observation may be made that if the ingenuity of man can create jurisdictional problems in regard to the
taxation of land, his accomplishments in the tax fields of less stable
types of property and of privileges must be tremendous.
PART

II.

TANGIBLE PERSONAL PROPERTY

PROPERTY TAXES

The Tax Situs
The tax rule is well established that tangible personal property
is considered to be with the owner and taxable by his domiciliary
state unless it is permanently located outside the state.3 4 When the
321d. at 543.

33169 U.S. 421 (1898).
34Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Minnesota, 322 U.S. 292 (1944); Ayer ', Lord Tie
Co. v. Kentucky, 202 U.S. 409 (1906); Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky,
199 U.S. 194 (1905); St. Louis v. Ferry Co., infra note 36.
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property is temporarily located elsewhere the Court has utilized a
fiction to justify a tax by the domiciliary state. Since the situs of
the property is said to follow the owner,3 5 the use of the Latin maxim
mobilia sequuntur personam has been employed to express this
concept.3 6
Permanency of Location
Property that has been kept in a non-domiciliary state for a period
sufficient in length for the Court to consider a tax situs to have been
acquired may be taxed there.37 Accordingly, if an owner of tangibles
keeps them in a state for immediate or eventual sale, or even if not
for sale, with a sufficient degree of permanency, they are taxable
there despite the fact that he is domiciled elsewhere. 38 This is also
true of tangibles maintained under a contract whereby they are
used regularly in a non-domiciliary state. 39
The requirement of permanency of location within a non-domiciliary state as a prerequisite to the taxation of that property is a
40
child of the due process of law clause of the fourteenth amendment.
Without the necessary degree of permanency there is no tax situs within the jurisdiction, and consequently an exaction in the guise of a
tax amounts to the taking of property without due process of law.4 '
As will be evident throughout this study, an adequate conception
of the degree of permanency required for the acquirement of a tax
situs by tangible personal property has its ramifications. It is apparent
that such a concept cannot contemplate all property physically located
within a tax jurisdiction, since mere temporary location will not support a tax situs. 42 It is obvious, also, that when the fiction of mobilia
sequuntur personam is applied in a proper case the requirement of
actual permanency of location is nullified. The treatment of tangible
35State R.R. Tax Cases, 92 U.S. 575 (1875); Tappan v. Merchants' Nat'l Bank,

86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 490 (1873).
36E.g., St. Louis v. Ferry Co., 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 423 (1870).
3701d Dominion S.S. Co. v. Virginia, 198 U.S. 299 (1905); see Pullman's Palace
Car Co. v. Pennsylvania, 141 U.S. 18 (1891), and cases cited therein.
S8Hannis Distilling Co. v. Mayor of Baltimore, 216 U.S. 285 (1910); Selliger v.
Kentucky, 213 U.S. 200 (1909); Thompson v. Kentucky, 209 U.S. 340 (1908); Carstairs v. Cochran, 193 U.S. 10 (1904).
39Gromer v. Standard Dredging Co., 224 U.S. 362 (1912).
40Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Minnesota, 322 U.S. 292 (1944).
41Standard Oil Co. v. Peck, 342 U.S. 382 (1952).
42New York ex rel. N.Y. Cent. & H.R.R.R. v. Miller, 202 U.S. 584 (1906).
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personalty as being with the owner in one state when it is actually located in another state, albeit temporarily, places a greater strain on
the requirement of permanent physical location than it will stand.
The discussion to come later concerning the acquirement of a tax
situs by fleets of vehicles engaged in the transportation of goods in
interstate commerce will reveal that the required permanency of location means only that the property in this particular class of cases
must be within the jurisdiction for the entire tax period. Its permanent physical location without any departures, however, is not required. 43 Significant also with reference to this class of cases is the
recognition that an average or a portion of a fleet of vehicles may
acquire a tax situs outside the domiciliary state of the owner even
though no particular vehicle in the fleet is required to be in the
44
taxing state for the entire year.

Other interstate commerce cases, to be discussed subsequently,
indicate that in some instances the Court has paid little heed to the
requirement of permanency for the establishment of a tax situs.
These cases are concerned with commodities, as distinguished from
instrumentalities or vehicles, in the stream of commerce. In determining when these commodities are taxable by a state, the Court
requires that they be taken out of the stream of interstate commerce. 45 Once out of interstate commerce they have been considered
taxable, apparently with little thought given to the requirement of
permanency of location, which has been considered so important in
46
the case of vehicles engaged in interstate commerce.
Thus it becomes evident that an all-inclusive definition of the
term permanency as it relates to the acquirement of a tax situs of
tangible personal property would be cumbersome and probably misleading. Since most of this article is concerned directly or indirectly
with the multitude of meanings involved in connotations of this term,
no definition will be included.
Tangibles in Interstate Commerce
State property taxation of tangible personal property is often
complicated by the fact that some of this property is traveling from
one state to another as an instrumentality in which goods are being
43Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Minnesota, 322 U.S. 292 (1944).
44Pullman's Palace Car Co. v. Pennsylvania, 141 U.S. 18 (1891).
45
See Pt. II infra, subheading " (b). Commodities."
46See ibid. and " (a). Instrumentalities."
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transported in interstate commerce. In addition, the commercial
commodity itself has caused judicial complexities by being in the
stream of commerce between the states.
The United States Constitution does not prohibit a state from imposing a non-discriminatory property tax on tangible personal prop47
erty within its jurisdiction that is employed in interstate commerce.
The application of this principle, however, requires the Court to
reach two important decisions in the light of constitutional requirements. First, the question must be answered whether any of the tangibles have acquired a tax situs in the taxing state for the purpose of
subjection to a property tax. The imposition of a tax on property
when no situs exists is a violation of the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment. 48 Second, assuming that a tax situs has been
acquired by some of the property in the taxing state, a determination
must be made as to what portion of the interstate organism may appropriately be attributed to the particular state seeking to impose
the tax. This determination is concerned with the requirements of
the commerce clause, 49 since the taxation of a greater share of the
property than rightfully should be apportioned to the state would
unduly burden interstate commerce.
a. Instrumentalities
The general rule has long been settled that the domiciliary state
of an owner has the power to impose a property tax on his tangible
instrumentalities engaged in transporting commodities in interstate
commerce. 50 Early recognition was also accorded the fact that a tax
situs can be acquired outside the domiciliary state of the owner,
provided that the instrumentalities remain in the non-domiciliary
state for a period sufficient in length for them to be considered as incorporated in the general mass of property within that state.51 The
Supreme Court, in spite of having recognized the possibility of a
47Pullman's Palace Car Co. v. Pennsylvania, 141 U.S. 18 (1891).
48Braniff Airways v. Nebraska State Bd., 347 U.S. 590 (1954).
490tt v. Mississippi Valley Barge Line Co., 336 U.S. 169 (1949). U.S. CONST.
art. 1, §8, cd. 3, provides, inter alia, that Congress shall have the power to regulate
commerce among the states. The discussion of the cases will indicate how a
state may violate this provision by the use of its tax power.
5OSee Ayer & Lord Tie Co. v. Kentucky, 202 U.S. 409 (1906), and cases cited
therein.
5iHays v. Pacific Mail S.S. Co., 58 U.S. (17 How.) 596 (1854).
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tax situs outside the domiciliary state, was not easy to convince that
any particular situation was an appropriate one for the establishment
of such a situs. 5 2 The early cases involved vessels engaged in coast-

wise interstate commerce. Their periodic but short stays in a nondomiciliary state for the purpose of loading and unloading passengers
were not acceptable as sufficient for the establishment of a tax situs.
The Court, however, impliedly recognized that a situs could be created
if the stays were sufficient in number. 53 The recognition of this
possibility has been of no practical value, since the Court has never
actually allowed a non-domiciliary state to impose a property tax on
ocean-going vessels engaged in coastal trade. The taxation of vessels
in this type of trade is apparently governed by principles applied to
vessels that cross the ocean. Vessels traveling over the ocean are taxable at the domiciliary state of the owner even though they are never
in the domiciliary state. 54 The mere fact that the vessels are enrolled
in a non-domiciliary state has never been held sufficient for the establishment of a tax situs in that state. 55 In Old Dominion S.S. Co.
v. Virginia,56 however, the vessels, although engaged in interstate
commerce, were navigated wholly within the limits of the non-domiciliary state, Virginia. They were held to be taxable by this state
because they had acquired a permanent situs. Dredges have been
held taxable in a non-domiciliary state in which they were kept regu57
larly and employed in the work for which they were designed.
The Doctrine of Apportionment. In early cases involving the
question of a non-domiciliary state's power to tax a fleet of tangible
instrumentalities used in the transportation of goods in interstate
commerce, the Court apparently did not seriously consider the possibility that only a proportion of the whole fleet might acquire a tax
situs in a single non-domiciliary state. The assumption seems to have
been that if a tax situs was established in the foreign state the entire
fleet entering the state was taxable.
In 1891 the Court approved Pennsylvania's deviation from this
52Transportation Co. v. Wheeling, 99 U.S. 273 (1878); Morgan v. Parham, 83
U.S. (16 Wall.) 471 (1872); St. Louis v. Ferry Co., 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 423 (1870);
Hays v. Pacific Mail S.S. Co., supra note 51.
53Morgan v. Parham, supra note 52; Hays v. Pacific Mail S.S. Co., supra note 51.

54Southern Pac. Co. v. Kentucky, 222 U.S. 63 (1911).
S5 See Ayer & Lord Tie Co. v. Kentucky, 202 U.S. 409 (1906).
56198 U.S. 299 (1905).
57Gromer v. Standard Dredging Co., 224 U.S. 362 (1912).
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8
assumption. In Pullman'sPalace Car Co. v. Pennsylvania"
a foreign
corporation was engaged in running railroad cars into, through, and
out of the state. It had, at all times during the tax period, an average
of one hundred cars in the state, although no particular cars were

within the state for all of this period. The Court was satisfied that
this average number of cars had acquired a tax situs in the nondomiciliary state. Although the constitutional provision with which
the Court was expressly concerned was the commerce clause, the fact
that a tax situs was tacitly recognized to exist indicates that the due
process provision was satisfied. The Court drew a distinction between
instrumentalities engaged in interstate transportation over land and
similar commerce by water. This distinction was based on the
"strikingly dissimilar" aspects of the two types of commerce. State
interference by taxation with the use of natural waterways was considered unjustifiable constitutionally. Interference with artificial roadways was another matter. 59
More than a half century later the Court reversed this position
in so far as inland water routes were concerned. In Ott v. Mississippi
Valley Barge Line Co.60 a foreign corporation employed tugboats and
barges in its interstate business of transporting freight on the Mississippi River. These vessels traveled constantly in and out of Louisiana
but were in that state for only the comparatively short periods of time
required to discharge and take on cargo and to make repairs. The
Court concluded that a certain proportion of the total number of
these vessels had acquired a tax situs in Louisiana and were taxable
there by virtue of the application of an acceptable apportionment
formula. The Court expressly limited its decision to instrumentalities engaged in interstate commerce on inland waterways. Care was
taken to note that the decision did not reach the taxability of ocean
carriage, either in coastal or foreign commerce. Cases dealing with
attempts to tax instrumentalities engaged in these types of commerce
were cited. In all of them, however, the question whether a tax situs
could be acquired by ocean-going vessels in a non-domiciliary state
on an apportionment basis, as used in the Pullman's Palace Car Co.
and Ott cases, either was not involved or was not considered. This
question remains unanswered.
58141 U.S. 18 (1891).

SsJ9ohnson Oil Co. v. Oklahoma, 290 U.S. 158 (1933), is another example of a
constitutional tax on instrumentalities engaged in an interstate transportation
business conducted on land.
60336 U.S. 169 (1949).
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The Court was not long in extending the reasoning of the Pullman's Palace Car Co. and Ott cases to cover air transportation. In
Braniff Airways v. Nebraska State Board61 a foreign corporation's aircraft made eighteen stops per day in Nebraska. The corporation
rented ground facilities, purchased and paid for fuel, and picked up
and discharged freight and passengers in Nebraska. The same aircraft did not land in Nebraska every day, however, and none was
there continuously. Regardless of this fact, the regularity of contact
of the aircraft with Nebraska and the benefit derived therefrom formed
a basis for the acquirement of a tax situs sufficient to support the
levy of an apportioned ad valorem property tax on the aircraft.
The Court seems well on its way to reaching the conclusion that
a non-domiciliary state may tax, on an apportionment basis, instrumentalities engaged in interstate commerce regardless of the type of
transportation involved, provided that the nature of the contact of
the instrumentalities with the state is substantial and continuous. A
consistent decision concerning instrumentalities engaged in coast-wise
interstate commerce is apparently all that is lacking to warrant this
conclusion.
A frequently used manner of expressing the requirement that a
tax situs must be established in a non-domiciliary state by instrumentalities engaged in interstate commerce is that a defined part of the
domiciliary corpus must be permanently located in that state.62 The
Pullman's Palace Car, Ott, and Braniff cases illustrate how this requirement may be satisfied. Others, however, have failed to meet the
test.
In New York ex rel. N.Y. Cent. & H.R.R.R. v. Miller,63 decided
in 1906, a New York railroad corporation engaged in interstate commerce sent its railroad cars over roads in New York and other states.
The corporation owned some of the roads; others it hired. In addition, cars were sent over other lines as well as its own and at times
were even used by other railroad companies for their independent
business. The cars were often out of the possession of the corporation
for some time before returning to the domiciliary state, New York.
No cars were used continuously and exclusively outside New York
during the entire year. The corporation contended that these facts
61347 U.S. 590 (1954).

62E.g., Standard Oil Co. v. Peck, 342 U.S. 382 (1952); Northwest Airlines, Inc.
v. Minnesota, 322 U.S. 292 (1944); New York ex rel. N.Y. Cent. & H.R.R.R. v.
Miller, infra note 63.
63202 U.S. 584.
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entitled it to deduct a proportion of the total number of railroad
cars in the computation of the New York franchise tax. The Court
disagreed unanimously, reasoning that the nature of the tax presented
no difficulty because a franchise tax measured by tangible personal
property may be treated as a tax on the property. In such a case the
property must have a tax situs in the taxing state. The position was
then taken that none of the railroad cars had lost the tax situs in
the domiciliary state and none had acquired a non-domiciliary tax
situs by virtue of travels outside New York. Pullman's Palace Car
Co., in which an ascertained average of railroad cars had been held
to have acquired a tax situs in a non-domiciliary state, was distinguished. There the same cars were continuously receiving the protection of the non-domiciliary state, and it was just that the state
should tax a proportion of them. Here, however, no specific or average number of cars were shown to have been so continuously in any
other state as to be taxable there. The Court pointed out that there
was no constitutional objection to taxation of the property of a corporation by its domiciliary state even if that property should be taken
"successively into another state for a day, a week, or six months" and
then brought back. The underlying reasoning is that occasional
excursions to foreign parts do not destroy the permanent situs of the
property in the domiciliary state.
In 1944 New York ex rel. N.Y. Cent. & H.R.R.R. v. Miller was
used as a case directly in point when Northwest Airlines, Inc. v.
Minnesotao4 was decided. Minnesota, the domiciliary state of the corporate owner, levied a property tax on an entire fleet of airplanes
engaged in interstate commerce. The airplanes were used to transport passengers, freight, and mail on regular, fixed routes in Minnesota and several other states. All were flying continuously from state
to state except when grounded for repairs in the home port of St.
Paul, where the corporate owner's principal place 'of business was
located. Only fourteen per cent of the scheduled route mileage was
in the domiciliary state. Some of the planes had been taxed by some
of the non-domiciliary states in which they traveled.
A bare majority of the Court held that Minnesota violated neither
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment nor the commerce clause by imposing the tax. The reasoning of the Court in
the Miller case was considered to be particularly pertinent to this
situation. The Court was convinced that in spite of the facts that
64322 U.S. 292.
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eighty-six per cent of the scheduled mileage of the planes was in nondomiciliary states, that the planes operated on fixed routes, and that
some of them had been taxed by some of these states, there had been
no satisfactory showing that a defined part of the domiciliary corpus
had acquired a tax situs outside the domiciliary state; consequently,
all were taxable by the domiciliary state. It is interesting to note that
while the majority specifically disclaimed making any decision as to
the validity of the taxes collected by the non-domiciliary states, it
based the right of the domiciliary state to tax on the lack of acquirement of tax situs elsewhere.
The Court stressed the fact that the doctrine of apportionment
used in Pullman's Palace Car Co. and other cases had never been
applied in theory or practice to units of interstate commerce visiting
a non-domiciliary state for fractional parts of a year. Continuous protection for the entire year by a state other than the domiciliary state
was deemed to furnish the constitutional basis for tax apportionment
in such interstate commerce situations. Without this protection the
required degree of permanency of location of the property in the
non-domiciliary state was lacking. The majority concluded that the
domiciliary state remained the permanent situs of the property notwithstanding its "occasional excursion to foreign parts."
The four dissenting justices felt that instruments of interstate
transportation moving over fixed routes on regular schedules acquired
a tax situs in every state through which they passed.65 They recognized, however, that in some cases vehicles of transportation moving
interstate had been held to be so sporadically and irregularly present
in other states that they acquired no situs there. They also distinguished the situation facing the Court in Miller. There, they reasoned, the cars moved not only over the carrier's own tracks but
also were interchanged with other railroads and moved almost at
random throughout the United States. Further, in the Miller case no
evidence was offered tending to show in what state the cars moved,
or with what degree of regularity they were present in any particular state or group of states other than the domiciliary state.
A comparison of Northwest Airlines with Braniff, in which a tax
situs was acquired by a defined part of the domiciliary corpus, consisting of airplanes, makes an interesting study. Braniff was decided
ten years after Northwest Airlines; and, although it may be contended that a degree of inconsistency exists between the two decisions,
651d. at 308.
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the Court in Braniff expressly refused to find any fault with its position in Northwest Airlines.66
The Effect of Apportionment on the Domiciliary State. Recognition of the right of the non-domiciliary state to impose a property
tax on instrumentalities engaged in interstate transportation led to
the question of the extent of the right of the domiciliary state to
impose a property tax on the same property. In 1952 Standard Oil
Co. v. Peck 67 faced the Court. Ohio levied a property tax on the
entire fleet of an Ohio corporation's boats and barges which it employed for the transportation of oil on the Mississippi and Ohio
rivers. Oil was neither picked up nor discharged in Ohio. The main
terminals were in Tennessee, Kentucky, and Louisiana. The maximum distance traversed by the boats and barges on any trip through
waters bordering Ohio was seventeen and one-half miles. There was
an unresolved doubt that any of this stretch of river was actually
in Ohio. The vessels were registered in Ohio and stopped there
occasionally for fuel and repairs. No loading or unloading was accomplished in Ohio. None of the non-domiciliary states had attempted to tax any of the vessels, and there was no showing that any
proportion of the vessels were in any one state for the whole of the
tax year.
The Court held that the rule permitting taxation by two or more
states on an apportionment basis precludes taxation of all the property by the domiciliary state of the owner. To hold otherwise, the
Court stated, would open the way to multiple taxation of interstate
operations; furthermore, the tax would have no relation to the
opportunities, benefits, or protection given by the taxing state to
those operations. Thus, in the process of invalidating the tax, the
Court apparently utilized the commerce clause by implying that multiple taxation of interstate operations unduly burdens interstate commerce. The due process of law clause also was an impossible hurdle
for the tax, since the imposition of such an exaction required the
taxpayer to pay for protection that was not being rendered because
all of the property did not have a situs in the domiciliary state. The
fact that the non-domiciliary states had not attempted to tax was not
disturbing because of the apparent assumption that the existence of a
tax situs does not depend on its use.
66The same attitude was expressed in Standard Oil Co. v. Peck, 342 U.S. 382
(1952), two years before the Braniff decision was rendered.

07342 U.S. 382.
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The Court distinguished Miller and Northwest Airlines, in both
of which the domiciliary state was allowed to tax the entire fleet of
instrumentalities engaged in interstate transportation. In these cases
there was no showing that a defined part of the domiciliary corpus
had acquired a tax situs elsewhere. These cases were deemed to have
no application to the Peck situation, since the boats and barges that
Ohio presumed to tax were "almost continuously" outside Ohio
during the tax year; consequently, the non-domiciliary states could
tax them on an apportionment basis. The boats and barges in the
Peck case admittedly were in the owner's domiciliary state for some,
though a minor part, of the tax year. This was true also of the airplanes in Northwest Airlines even though, presumably, the period of
time was greater than in the Peck case. Apparently, therefore, since
both decisions are in the good graces of the Court, the difference
between the two must be recognized as nothing but a matter of degree - poor consolation for the lawyer in his role as legal prophet. The
ease with which the Court assumed, merely on the basis of a showing
of continuous absence rather than actual situs, that the vessels in the
Peck case had acquired a tax situs outside the domiciliary state is
somewhat disconcerting. This sentiment is strengthened by the Court's
adamant attitude exhibited in Northwest Airlines when it held strong
evidence tending to establish the existence of a tax situs outside the
domiciliary state to be inconsequential.
Three years after the Peck decision additional light was thrown
on the attitude of the Court toward the decision in Northwest Airlines. This clarification appeared in the Braniff opinion, in which a
tax situs in a non-domiciliary state was recognized as having been
acquired by airplanes.68 The Court disagreed with the contention
that Northwest Airlines would have to be overruled in order to hold
that airplanes could acquire a tax situs in a non-domiciliary state.
It added that if there had been a satisfactory showing in Northwest
Airlines that a defined part of the domiciliary corpus had acquired
a tax situs outside the domiciliary state, it would be fair to say that
the domiciliary state would not have been allowed to tax the entire
fleet of airplanes. Thus the Court indicated by way of dictum that the
rule adopted in the Peck case with reference to instrumentalities in
interstate commerce on inland waters was also applicable to instrumentalities engaged in such commerce by air transportation.
Presumably the extent to which the domiciliary state can impose
68347 U.S. 590 (1954).
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a property tax in the Peck situation is now the same as that accorded
a non-domiciliary state: it can tax that proportion of the total amount
of property determined by the use of an equitable formula that accords fair tax apportionment among all the states in which a tax
situs has been established. In the Peck case the share of the domiciliary state would have been negligible. Such an arrangement would
work to the advantage of the interstate carrier unless all qualified
states took full advantage of their rights to tax, since, to the extent
that one or more of the states did not tax, the property would escape
taxation. On the other hand, when all qualified states began to tax,
the carrier probably would find itself in the unenviable position of
contesting the validity of various tax formulae; the independent administration of the tax formulae could easily result in a total tax in
excess of what it should pay.
The Role of Apportionment in Foreign Commerce. There is a
possibility that instrumentalities engaged in foreign commerce that
habitually frequent the ports of a non-domiciliary state in this
country may be held to be taxable in that state on an apportionment
basis. The practical facts, however, tend to minimize the chance of
such a situation arising as long as the Court stresses the requirement
of a substantial contact with the non-domiciliary state. This type of
situation is not concerned with the interstate portion of the commerce clause, since interstate commerce is not involved; but the same
provision of the United States Constitution that gives Congress the
power to regulate commerce between the states also gives that body
the power to regulate foreign commerce. 69 Whether the Court will
be more lenient in its conception of the constitutional requirements
for the acquirement of a tax situs in the non-domiciliary state in
such a situation than it requires under the interstate commerce clause
is a matter of pure speculation. One interesting observation seems
to be pertinent. If such a situation were presented to the Court,
there is little doubt that it would be called upon to determine the
scope of its holding in Southern Pacific Co. v. Kentucky,7 0 in which
the domiciliary state of the corporate owner was allowed to tax the
perenially absent fleet of ocean-going steamships in order to prevent
its escape from all state property taxation.
The Formula for Equitable Apportionment. In the beginning of
art. I, §8,
70222 U.S. 63 (1911).

69U.S. CONST.

di. 3.
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this discussion of property taxation of instrumentalities in interstate
commerce the point was made that even though a court may be satisfied that a tax situs has been acquired in a state by a portion of the
whole number of instrumentalities touching that state, the Court's
task is not complete. The exact portion of the interstate organism that
may apportionately be attributed to the taxing state in which it functions must be ascertained. This is a requirement of the commerce
clause in order to insure that interstate commerce shall remain free
from state regulation.71
Various formulae for apportioning the property equitably have
been used by the taxing states. The fairness of the formula depends
upon the situation in which it is applied, but if the Court is satisfied
as to its equitable operation the requirement of the commerce clause
has been met. 72 A state's formula providing for assessment of the
same proportion of the corporate owner's interstate railroad cars as
the number of miles of railroad over which the cars were run within
the taxing state bore to the total number of miles of railroad in all
the states over which its cars were run was held valid in the light of
the commerce clause. 73 This type of mileage formula is not uncommon. It has been specifically upheld several times, 74 but it may be inequitable under certain circumstances, such as extreme variations in
75
density of traffic.
b. Commodities
As long as tangible commodities are in what the Court considers
the stream of interstate commerce they are not to be subjected to state
property taxation, since a tax on such commerce by a state is an unconstitutional regulation thereof. 76 This is true regardless of whether
they cross state boundaries by being transported in a vehicle, 77 are
propelled by natural forces,7 8 or utilize their own power.79 The
7'Ott v. Mississippi Valley Barge Line Co., 336 U.S. 169 (1949).
721bid.
73Pullman's Palace Car Co. v. Pennsylvania, 141 U.S. 18 (1891).
740tt v. Mississippi Valley Barge Line Co., supra note 71; Nashville, C. & St.
L. Ry. v. Browning, 310 U.S. 362 (1940).
75Union Tank Line Co. v. Wright, 249 U.8. 275 (1919). An interesting but
complicated formula that the Court approved appears in Braniff Airways v. Nebraska State Bd., 347 U.S. 590 (1954).
7GCase of the State Freight Tax, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 232 (1872).
77Ibid.
7sCoe v. Errol, 116 U.S. 517 (1886).
79Kelly v. Rhoads, 188 U.S. 1 (1903).
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determination of when such commerce begins and when it ends
obviously becomes important.
When a commodity has begun to move as an article of trade from
one state to another, interstate commerce has begun.8 0 Preliminary
work, such as carrying commodities in vehicles or floating them to
the depot where the journey is to commence, is not a part of interstate transportation.-' Accordingly, logs taken to the bank of a river,
where some were put into the river with the intention of sending
them down the river to another state, were held not to be in interstate commerce.8 2 Even when logs were put into a stream in the
domiciliary state of the owner and floated to a point in that state
where they were held while awaiting shipment by rail to other states
as the demands in those states justified, the interstate journey was
considered as not yet begun.83 In such cases the taxability of the logs

at ,their situs was recognized to be unaffected by the requirement of
the commerce clause.
At times the interstate transit concededly has begun but is interrupted. The question then presented is whether the interruption
terminates the interstate nature of the movement to such an extent
that the commerce clause no longer protects the property from taxation by the state in which it is then located. Again floating logs
created a problem for the Court.8 4 In this instance they were placed
in a river, and after the floating journey had commenced they were
held for a short time at a boom in a town to await subsidence of high
water which made it unsafe to continue the journey immediately. The
logs were held immune from a local property tax, since the temporary
interruption was caused by the necessity of the journey.
Sheep being driven across Wyoming from Utah to Nebraska
grazed on both public and private lands en route.8 5 The journey of
500 miles took from six to eight weeks; the daily travel averaged about
nine miles. Wyoming's attempt to tax the sheep failed because the
sheep were held to be in uninterrupted interstate transit in spite
of the periods of grazing. The Court was convinced that the average
sOCoe v. Errol, 116 U.S. 517 (1886).

8lHeisler v. Thomas Colliery Co., 260 U.S. 245 (1922); Coe v. Errol, supra note
80.

82Coe'v. Errol, 116 U.S. 517 (1886).
83Diamond Match Co. v. Ontonagon, 188 U.S. 82 (1903).
84Champlain Realty Co. v. Town of Brattleboro, 260 U.S. 366 (1922); accord,
Hughes Brothers Timber Co. v. Minnesota, 272 U.S. 469 (1926).
8sKelly v. Rhoads, 188 U.S. 1 (1903).
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mileage covered was ample proof that the sheep had not been
brought into the state for the mere purpose of grazing.
Property that concededly has been in the stream of interstate
commerce may be taxed where it comes to rest if it has been stopped
to take advantage of a local facility not directly ancillary to its
interstate movement. Several examples should be sufficient to clarify
this principle. Grain being shipped through Illinois was withdrawn
from the carrier and stored in an elevator for the temporary purpose
of inspecting, weighing, cleaning, grading, and mixing it.6
It was
then replaced in the hands of a carrier and transported to New York.
The grain was held to be taxable in Illinois. The Court was impressed by the fact that the property, during the interruption of transit, was being held for the owner's own purposes and with full power
of disposition. Coal shipped to New Jersey was taken from cars
and kept in that state in advance of definite orders from other states.8 7
The Court was convinced that the accumulation of stock between
mine and market was for the owner's convenience in filling coal
orders more readily. The stop was more than a mere incident of
interstate transportation; hence the coal was taxable in New Jersey.
Similarly, interstate transit was held to have ceased when oil shipped
from other states was removed from cars and placed in storage tanks
to await future orders.,
Here, again, the temporary storage was
considered to be for the business purposes and profits of the owner.
When tangibles arrive at their destination and become part of a
common mass of property within a state they may be subjected to
property taxes.8 9 Interstate commerce terminates when the property
arrives at its final destination even though it remains in the vehicle
in which it was transported into the state. 90 The latter holding was
later applied to property that had arrived in the state of its destination but was offered for sale while it was a few miles up the river
from the established market place. 91
In summary, the commerce clause does not confer immunity from
state taxation upon property unless it is actually in the course of
86Bacon v. Illinois, 227 U.S. 504 (1913).

87Susquehanna Coal Co. v. City of South Amboy, 228 U.S. 665 (1913).
SsGeneral Oil Co. v. Crain, 209 U.S. 211 (1908). An excise tax was involved in
this case, but there is no reason to conclude that the question whether interstate
transit has ceased depends upon the type of tax that is sought to be imposed.
89Minnesota v. Blasius, 290 U.S. 1 (1933).
9OBrown v. Houston, 114 U.S. 622 (1885).
9OPittsburg & Southern Coal Co. v. Bates, 156 U.S. 577 (1895).
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interstate transit. "Transit" is construed broadly enough to include
stops necessarily incident thereto. Transit alone does not deprive the
state of origin or the state of destination of jurisdiction to tax; the
transit must be of an interstate character. When a distinct halt in
the transit brings a gain that otherwise would not ensue, the Court
frowns on efforts to escape local taxation.
There is an aspect of the foregoing decisions that is disconcerting
in the light of the recognized requirement of permanency of location
of property as a prerequisite of the establishment of a tax situs. When
the Court holds that the state of origin may tax logs intended for
interstate transit but that have been subjected only to preliminary
activities on tax day,92 it is obvious that the logs have not yet lost
their original tax situs. The state of origin, therefore, can take advantage of this fact without being affected by the operation of the
commerce clause. On the other hand, when the property has entered
the stream of commerce and the transit is interrupted subsequently to
the extent that the Court rules the property taxable in the state where
the interruption occurred, 93 the Court does not seem concerned with
the item of permanency. This is particularly noticeable in cases
in which interstate transit has been held to cease and the property
held taxable when it is in storage awaiting future orders from other
states. 94 It is obvious that such property usually does not assume
a substantial degree of permanency of location in the taxing state.
By its apparent assumption of the existence of a tax situs of commodities merely because the interstate transit has ceased, the Court
gave more latitude to the commerce clause than it was willing to
do with reference to the acquirement of a tax situs by instrumentalities engaged in interstate transportation. In the latter cases the
requirements of the due process clause were recognized as determinative of the existence of a tax situs. 95 In the former the Court
seemed to be thinking of the.commerce clause not only witl 'reference
to the unconstitutionality of the regulation of interstate commerce
by a state but also with reference to tax situs. A serious inconsistency
seems to result.
Double Taxation
In the early cases establishing that a non-domiciliary state could
92Coe v. Errol, 116 U.S. 517 (1886).
3
9 See note 37 supra.
9
4See notes 87, 88 supra.
9,Braniff Airways v. Nebraska State Bd., 347 U.S. 590 (1954); Standard Oil Co.
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impose a tax on tangibles in an appropriate situation, 96 the Court was
not concerned with whether the domiciliary state could also tax. At
that time the Court assumed that there was no constitutional prohibition against double taxation in this type of situation. 97 In 1905,
however, the issue was directly presented in Union Refrigerator
Transit Co. v. Kentucky,9 in which the due process limitation on
the jurisdiction of a state to tax tangible personalty was first expressly imposed.99 The Court held that tangible personal property
in the form of refrigerator cars located permanently in foreign states
and employed there in the prosecution of the owner's business could
not be the subject of a property tax by the domiciliary state of the
owner. The property was wholly outside the territorial jurisdiction
of the domiciliary state's taxing power and received no protection
from its laws, for which the tax was supposed to compensate. Consequently, the Court stated, to subject the property to a property tax
by the owner's domiciliary state would be to deprive the owner
of his property without due process of law. The Court thus clearly
implied that the refrigerator cars had acquired a tax situs in the
foreign state.100 Mr. Justice Holmes dissented.101 He agreed that
the result reached by the majority of the Court probably was a desirable one, but he disagreed that the fourteenth amendment required such a decision. This eminent jurist consistently contended,
over a period of approximately thirty years, that there is no federal
constitutional prohibition of double taxation by the states. Subsequent parts of this article will reveal the significance of his position.
In 1953 the Court impliedly affirmed its holding in the Union
Refrigerator case by its reasoning in Dameron v. Brodhead,102 in
which it upheld the applicability of the Soldiers' and the Sailors'
v. Peck, 342 U.S. 382 (1952).
96See notes 37, 38, 39 supra.
97Coe v. Errol, 116 U.S. 517 (1886).
9s199 U.S. 194.
99
In Delaware, L. & W.R.R. v. Pennsylvania, 198 U.S. 341, decided the same
year, the Court reached the same decision on the same basis, but the situation
involved a tax statute that concededly did not authorize taxation of such property.
looSee Dameron v. Brodhead, 345 U.S. 322 (1953), in which the right of the
domiciliary state to tax was saved by virtue of a federal statute concerned with a
federal instrumentality. The assumption of the Court apparently was that, in the
absence of statute, the domiciliary state would have no power to tax tangibles located for the entire year in a non-domiciliary state.
101199 U.S. at 211.
102345 U.S. 322.
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Civil Relief Act.1° 3 Under this act the property of a serviceman is
deemed not to lose its situs in his domiciliary state or acquire a taxable
situs in another state by virtue of being kept in the latter state solely
by reason of compliance with military or naval orders directing his
transfer to a military post in that state. In addition, the serviceman
is not regarded as losing his original domicile. The serviceman in
question, a domiciliary of Louisiana, had kept his household goods
in Colorado, the state to which he was transferred by military orders,
for the entire Colorado tax year. The goods, however, under the
aforementioned statutes acquired no tax situs in Colorado. The constitutionality of the statute was recognized by virtue of the constitutionally recognized immunity from state taxation of property engaged in a function of the federal government.
The interesting implication of this case from the standpoint of
the tax situs of tangible personal property is that in the absence of
the Soldiers' and Sailors' Relief Act the property would have been considered as having a tax situs in the State of Colorado by virtue of
being located there the entire tax year, in spite of the fact that the
owner of the property was living there only temporarily. It is true
that the statute saved both the tax situs of the property and the
domicile of the serviceman from change by military order; yet the
Court considered the part of the statute dealing with the tax situs
as crucial. From this fact emanates the strong inference that the
Court, in the absence of a federal statute, would not be concerned
with the domicile of the owner of the property in determining its
taxable situs.
The constitutional objection to taxation by the owner's domiciliary state of tangibles permanently located outside the state is
not without exception. In Southern Pacific Co. v. Kentucky1 4 the
State of Kentucky was more fortunate in its quest to tax tangibles
permanently located outside that state than it was in the Union Refrigerator case. Kentucky, the state of the corporate domicile, levied
a tax on a fleet of steamships owned by the corporation. The vessels
were never in Kentucky; they were permanently engaged in sailing
the high seas. The tax was apparently sustained for the reason that
since no tax situs had been acquired outside Kentucky the ships would
go tax free unless Kentucky were allowed to tax. The Court thus recognized that mobilia sequuntur personam, although largely devitalized
U.S.C. §574 (1958).
104222 U.S. 63 (1911).
10350
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by Union Refrigerator,is not completely dead with regard to property
permanently located outside the domiciliary state of the owner; if
no other state can tax the property, the domiciliary may exercise
the privilege. In its later treatment of the respective rights of the
domiciliary state and non-domiciliary states to tax instrumentalities
engaged in interstate commerce the Court has remained adamant in
its position with reference to the prohibition by the due process clause
of double taxation. 1° 5 While it recognizes the right of more than one
state to participate in the taxation of a fleet of interstate instrumentalities, its requirement of apportionment guarantees that the same
tangibles will not be taxed by more than one state at the same time.
With ieference to tangible commodities such as sheep and logs,
which are held taxable by virtue of an appropriate interruption in
the interstate transit, the picture of the constitutionality of double
taxation is not clear. If the cargo is stopped for the purpose of enjoying independent local advantages, such interruptions may expose the
tangibles to property taxation in more than one state in a normal tax
period if the states involved have different assessment dates. Apparently the Court has never been called upon to solve this problem. It is
safe to say, however, that under the current decisions there has been
no exception to the rule whereby tangible personal property enjoys
immunity from property taxation by more than one state, and to its
corollary that allows the domiciliary state to tax only when the
property has no tax situs elsewhere.
DEATH TAXES

There is no question that a state may impose death taxes with
reference to tangible personal property if the property has a tax situs
within the state. 10 6 Such a tax is usually considered an excise tax' 0 7
rather than one on property. Tax problems before the Court with
reference to this type of property have not been frequent.
Frick v. Pennsylvania,o° decided in 1925, undoubtedly furnishes
the most outstanding case law in this phase of a state's tax jurisdiction. The Court held that a Pennsylvania statute purporting to impose a death transfer tax on the part of a domiciliary's estate, both
105Standard Oil Co. v. Peck, 342 U.S. 382 (1952).

06Frick v. Pennsylvania, 268 U.S. 473 (1925).
lo7See 4 COOLEY, TAXATION §1723 (4th ed. 1924). In New York Trust Co. v.

Eisner, 256 U.S. 345 (1921), the Court recognized federal death taxes as excises.
108268 U.S. 473.
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real and personal, located in Pennsylvania contravened the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment because it included tangible
personal property having an actual situs in another state as part of
the gross estate. The Court found that Pennsylvania was attempting
to include property permanently located in New York and Massachusetts in the computation of its death tax on tangible personalty.
In spite of the fact that the decedent was a domiciliary of Pennsylvania, the property, by reason of its character and situs, was wholly
within the jurisdiction of the states in which it had actual situs. The
Court thereby adopted for death tax cases the rule that it had applied
to a property tax twenty years previously in the Union Refrigerator
case.109 Thus double taxation of tangible personal property is presently considered unconstitutional with reference both to property
taxes and death taxes.
In the Frick case the Court distinguished the situation from that
of Maxwell v. Bugbee,1 ° in which it had previously approved the inclusion of tangible property, including realty, located outside the
taxing state in the computation of the rate of the inheritance tax imposed on the transfer of property located within the taxing state.
The difference lay in the fact that the tax scheme in Frick called for
the imposition of a tax on the transfer of tangible personal property
located beyond the jurisdiction of the state seeking to impose the tax;
whereas in Bugbee, although property beyond the jurisdiction of the
taxing state was considered in arriving at the rate of tax, the taxable
transfer related only to property within the jurisdiction of the state.
In Bugbee the Court recognized that the inclusion of foreign property would result in an increased rate of taxation. It was of the
opinion, however, that a state statute providing for this procedure
did not violate the due process clause as long as the Court was satisfied that the rate was not increased to such an extent that the result
was tantamount to taxing the transfer of foreign property. The apparent arbitrary factor in such a position probably was the primary
reason that it became law by the decision of a bare majority of the
Court.
The question- whether tangibles were permanently located in a
non-domiciliary state so as to be subject to a death tax there under the
Frick rule was presented to the Court in 1934.111 A New York domil0See note 98 supra and accompanying text.
110250 U.S. 525 (1919).
i City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v. Schnader, 293 U.S. 112.
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ciliary lent paintings to a Philadelphia museum for exhibition under
an oral agreement, terminable at will, under which the paintings
could be sold for presentation to the museum. No definite time was
set for returning the paintings; they were still in Pennsylvania when
the owner died nearly three years later. The Court held that the
paintings were permanently located in Pennsylvania as contemplated
by the Frick rule. Accordingly, the property had acquired a tax situs
within Pennsylvania and its transfer could be subjected to a death
tax there.
The year 1949 saw the Court's most recent application of the
Frick rule.112 A Wisconsin emergency death tax statute was held to be
contrary to the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment because the statutory method of computing the tax required the inclusion of tangible property outside Wisconsin. The statute provided for a tax amounting to eighty per cent of the basic federal
estate tax, rated and measured by the entire estate, regardless of situs.
The decedent, a domiciliary of Wisconsin, owned personal and real
property in Illinois and Florida in addition to his Wisconsin property. The terminology "rated and measured" used by the Court
may be reminiscent of Bugbee to some extent, but the Court expressly held that Frick's facts and principles were particularly applicable in this situation. Thus the Court sustained its prior pronouncements of the constitutional prohibition against death taxation
of tangibles by the decedent's domiciliary state when they have acquired a tax situs outside the state.
A question may arise in the future as to the constitutionality of
a death duty imposed by a non-domiciliary state with reference to
tangible personalty that has acquired a situs for tax purposes under
the rules governing interstate commerce cases. A situation of this
kind apparently has never been presented to the Court. Since the
Court seems inclined to accept for death tax cases its conception of
situs of tangible personalty first adopted in property tax cases, the
treatment of the question should be interesting.
PART III. INTANGIBLE PERSONAL PROPERTY
PROPERTY TAXES

The nature of intangible personal property has created practical
and judicial difficulties. To say that an intangible is localized for
112Treichler v. Wisconsin, 338 U.S. 251.
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tax purposes in any particular place necessitates the employment of
a warrantable fiction or some other reason constitutionally justified
in the eyes of the Court by the revenue needs of the government.
Accordingly, the Court has employed the use of the maxim mobilia
sequuntur personam"' to hold that the domicile of the owner is the
tax situs of the intangible. 14
Justification for the use of the maxim is found in the difficulty of
the tax gatherer in locating evidence of intangibles and the uncertainty as to which taxing district affords benefits or protection to the
property represented by the evidence." 5 Normally the intangibles are
subject to the immediate control of the owner, and this close relationship furnishes an adequate .basis for a tax.11 6 The arbitrariness of
this position is recognized; but, since intangibles have no real situs,
the domicile of the owner is the nearest approximation. Even so, as
will appear in the following discussion, other taxing jurisdictions may
117
also have power to tax the same property.
Business Situs
Mobilia sequuntur personam has not been employed to preclude
property taxation of intangibles outside the domiciliary state of the
owner in all cases. The Court has recognized that such property may
acquire a situs for purposes of property taxation outside the owner's
domiciliary state if it is used as an integral part of a business in another state."" The maxim was not intended to operate to relieve the
owner of paying for the benefits and protection accorded his property
by this other state." 9 Consequently, the non-domiciliary state has
been allowed to impose a property tax on notes, mortgages, and certificates of indebtedness that were continually used within its borders
for purpose of reinvestment. 20 The tax situs thus acquired by the
intangibles has been referred to variously as the business sitUs12l or
the commercial domicile. 12 2 This doctrine of tax situs was held to
1i2Movables follow the person (of the owner).
114Kirtland v. Hotchkiss, 100 U.S. 491 (1879); Tappan v. Merchants' Nat'l Bank,
86 US. (19 Wall.) 490 (1873).
115Greenough v. Tax Assessor, 331 U.S. 486 (1947).
lI6lbid.
1171bid.
ll8New Orleans v. Stempel, 175 U.S. 309 (1899).
119lbid.
12olbid.
121First Bank Stock Corp. v. Minnesota, 301 U.S. 234 (1937).
122Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Fox, 298 U.S. 193 (1936).
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support West Virginia property taxes upon a Delaware corporation's
bank deposits in banks located outside West Virginia as well as accounts receivable owed by debtors residing outside that state. 23 The
commercial domicile was considered to be in West Virginia, since the
principal office of the corporation was located there; the accounts
receivable arose through contracts that were subject to acceptance or
rejection there; and all moneys of the corporation, including the
foreign bank deposits, were controlled from the principal office. One
year later stock of a Delaware corporation was held taxable by Min124
nesota on the same theory.
The requirements for the establishment of a business situs or
commercial domicile vary, largely because of differences in the nature
of the businesses and intangibles involved. 125 The general formula
requires that the intangibles become localized in the foreign state by
their use in a going, local business.126 This localization requires
more than mere isolated instances of usage, since the intangibles must
12
become an integral part of the business. 7

Some aspects of the doctrine of the business situs appear to be
definite. The tax situs is not the domicile of the creditor, 1 28 and it
need not be the domicile of the debtor.129 The evidence of intangibles
need not be in the state of the business situs.

3°

The doctrine is not

limited to any particular type of intangible."'1 Finally, in no case in
which the doctrine has been applied has the Court held that the
domiciliary state of the owner or another state that lends advantages
to the intangibles is prohibited from levying a property tax on the
intangibles.1

2

123Ibid.

124First Bank Stock Corp. v. Minnesota, supra note 121. Good will employed
by a non-resident in carrying on a business within a state is taxable there. Railway Express Agency v. Virginia, 358 U.S. 434 (1959); Adams Express Co. v.
Ohio State Auditor, 165 U.S. 194 (1897).
125E.g., compare the factual situations of Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Fox, 298
U.S. 193 (1936), and New Orleans v. Stempel, 175 U.S. 309 (1899).
126See text at note 123 supra.
127Ibid. The contention has been made that any use of intangibles in a general
business is sufficient to make them taxable; the Court did not find it necessary to
deal with this contention, however. Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Glander, 337 U.S.

562 (1949).
12sNew Orleans v. Stempel, 175 U.S. 309 (1899).
129Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Fox, 298 U.S. 193 (1936).
l3oIbid.; Bristol v. Washington County, 177 U.S. 133 (1900).
131See note 130 supra.
132See notes 118, 122 supra and accompanying text.
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The Corporate Domicile
Intangibles have been subjected constitutionally to property taxation on other bases than application of the maxim mobilia sequuntur personam and the doctrine of business situs. The stock of a domestic corporation is the subject of a property tax by the state of
incorporation even though the owner of the stock is a non-resident of
the taxing state.133 This type of intangible draws its lifeblood from
the laws of the state of corporate domicile; consequently, that state
is entitled to tax recompense. Other bases will appear in the subsequent discussion concerning intangibles held in trust.
Double Taxation
The proposition that more than one state may impose a property
tax on the same intangibles during the same period of time seems
to have been tacitly accepted in the early cases of the Court. In 1879
a debt was held to be taxable by the domiciliary state of the creditorowner;134 in 1899 a state of business situs constitutionally imposed a
property tax on intangibles; 35 and in 1905 a state lawfully imposed a
property tax on the stock of a domestic corporation even though the
stockholder was a non-resident. 3 6 In none of these cases was the
issue of double taxation presented.
Following the Union Refrigerator decision of 1905, in which
more than one state was prohibited from imposing a property tax
on tangible personal property, 37 a similar holding was sought with
reference to intangibles. 3 8 This was done in spite of the fact that
in Union Refrigerator a clear distinction was drawn between intangible and tangible personal property in regard to the propriety of
double taxation. Massachusetts assessed a property tax against a
domiciliary on the stock of a foreign corporation that owned no
property and did no business in that state. The taxpayer raised the
issue of double taxation by contending that since the holding in the
'33Schuylkill Trust Co. v. Pennsylvania, 302 U.S. 506 (1938); Corry v. Mayor
of Baltimore, 196 U.S. 466 (1905). A state may not impose a tax upon or with
respect to stock of a foreign corporation owned by a non-resident merely because
the corporation owns property in the state.
'S4Kirtland v. Hotchkiss, 100 U.S. 491.
'35New Orleans v. Stempel, 175 U.S. 309.
'36Corry v. Mayor of Baltimore, 196 U.S. 466.
' 37See note 98 supra and accompanying text.
13SHawley v. City of Maiden, 232 U.S. 1 (1914).
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earlier case of Cory v. Mayor of Baltimore139 permitted the corporate
domicile to tax stock as property located in the state of incorporation, Massachusetts should not be allowed to tax. The taxpayer
argued that the rule of Union Refrigerator precluded Massachusetts
from taxing. The Court, however, refused to apply this rule to intangibles that could have no physical situs. It pointed out that the
state of corporate domicile had not actually taxed the stock but clearly
implied that there was no constitutional objection to such taxation.
In 1917, in the leading case of Fidelity & Columbia Trust Co. v. City
of Louisville,140 bank accounts owned by a resident of Kentucky were
held taxable by Kentucky even though they had been taxed at their
business situs in Missouri. Mr. Justice Holmes, writing for the Court,
found such multiple taxation constitutionally unobjectionable.
Three years later taxation of intangibles by both the state of the
14 1
corporate domicile and the state of the business situs was approved.
North Dakota had assessed what purported to be a property tax on
the intangible property of a domestic corporation that had no property in the state and did no business there. The corporation alleged
previous taxing of the property by the state in which the company's
plant and business were located. The Court, apparently limiting the
meaning of its statement to intangible personal property, succinctly
pointed out that the fourteenth amendment does not prohibit double
taxation.
In 1937 the Court included in bne of its opinions a statement that
might be construed as an indication of a feeling of insecurity as to its
previously accepted position concerning double property taxation of
intangibles.1 42 In approving taxation by a business situs state against
the contention that a foreign corporation's shares of stock were
taxable exclusively by the corporate domicile, the Court conceded
the right of the corporate domicile to tax "at least in the absence of
activities identifying them with some other place as their 'business
situs.' "43 It probably is of significance to note that this expression,
which might be considered as auguring a change of position on the
139196 U.S. 466 (1905).
140245 U.S. 54.
141Cream of Wheat Co. v. County of Grand Forks, 253 U.S. 325 (1920).
142First Bank Stock Corp. v. Minnesota, 301 U.S. 234. Newark Fire Ins. Co. v.
State Bd., 307 U.S. 313 (1939), approved a property tax on intangibles by the state
of the corporate domicile, but four justices implied that they would not have so
held if a business situs had been shown to exist in another state.
143301 U.S. at 237.
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part of the Court, occurred before its decision in State Tax Comm'n
of Utah v. Aldrich 44 that death taxation of intangibles by more
than one state was again considered constitutional after a temporary
departure from this position in the early 1930'S.145 Since the Court
has applied the reasoning initially arising in a death tax case to a sit-

uation dealing with property taxation in which the same type of
property was involved,14

there seems to be little reason to doubt

that the present position of the Court is that double taxation of intangibles by the imposition of property taxes violates no provision
of the Federal Constitution.
DEATA TAxEs

The power of a domiciliary state of a decedent to impose a death
tax- on his intangibles is well settled in this country.1 47 This power
is based on the application of the maxim mobilia sequuntur personam.
This is true without regard to whether the intangibles are evidenced
by writing or otherwise and whether the papers are found in the
state of domicile or elsewhere. Further, the principle is not to be
shaken by inquiry into the question whether the transfer of the intangibles is also subject to taxation in another jurisdiction.148
The Court has indicated that it might not be bound by a state's
determination of the nature of a particular item as tangible or intangible. In Blodgett v. Silberman'49 bonds were recognized as intangible rather than tangible personal property, as they are sometimes considered under the laws of various states. 50 As intangibles,
the bonds were held subject to the application of the maxim.
The Blodgett case is noteworthy for another reason: the principles
of law underlying the doctrine of equitable conversion were recognized as applicable in an appropriate tax situation. 15 A New York
144316 U.S. 174 (1942).
145See note 154 infra and accompanying text.
14oStewart v. Pennsylvania, 312 U.S. 649 (1941), aft'g without opinion Commonwealth v. Stewart, 338 Pa. 9, 12 A.2d 444 (1940).
147E.g., Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co. v. Kelly, 319 U.S. 94 (1943);
Blodgett v. Silberman, 277 U.S. 1 (1928).

248See note 147 supra.
'20277 U.S. 1 (1928).
lSObid. See New Orleans v. Stempel, 175 U.S. 309 (1899), in which the Court
recognized that bonds sometimes are in such a concrete form that they are treated
as tangible personal property.

15lUnder this doctrine property of one kind is considered as acquiring charac-
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limited partnership interest owned by a Connecticut decedent was
considered intangible personal property under New York law even
though the partnership owned tangible personal property and realty
located in New York. The Court approved Connecticut's imposition
of a death tax on the partnership interest. Connecticut thus took advantage of the fact that the interest was deemed an intangible, thus
becoming taxable at the decedent's domicile in Connecticut. If the
partnership interest had been considered realty or tangible personalty
permanently located in New York, Connecticut would have had no
jurisdiction to tax.
Double Taxation
In Blackstone v. Miller,152 decided in 1903, the Court was faced
with the issue of the constitutionality of more than one state imposing
a death duty with reference to the same intangible personal property.
It held that New York, the debtor's state, could impose a death tax
on the transfer of a bank deposit located in the state for more than
a year before the owner, an Illinois domiciliary, died. It reasoned that
New York's jurisdiction to tax could not be based on mere temporary
presence of the bank credit within the state; but, since the credit
had been held for reinvestment in stocks for a substantial period, it
was delayed within the taxing power of New York long enough to
warrant considering its stay more than temporary. Consequently, its
transfer at death was taxable by that state. Mr. Justice Holmes, writing for the Court, recognized that the power of two states to tax on
different and more or less inconsistent principles produced hardship,
but found that these inconsistencies infringed no rule of constitutional
law.
The rule of Blackstone v. Miller, permitting multi-state death taxes
on intangibles,1 53 was in force until 1930, when the Holmes theory that
there is no constitutional objection to double taxation of intangibles
was completely, albeit temporarily, repudiated. Blackstone v. Miller
was specifically overruled,'15 and in situations dealing with various
teristics of property of another kind in order that a just and equitable objective may
be accomplished.
152188 U.S. 189.
153In considering the 1919 case of Maxwell v. Bugbee, 250 U.S. 525, which
involved multi-state death taxation of intangibles, the Court did not even consider

the possibility of the unconstitutionality of such taxation.

1s4Farmers Loan and Trust Co. v. Minnesota, 280 U.S. 204 (1930).
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types of intangibles and death taxes the domiciliary state of the
decedent owner was considered to have exclusive power to impose such
taxes. 55 In reaching this decision the Court was influenced greatly
by its prior treatment of tangible personal property as immune from
double taxation"56 and its desire to refrain from unjust and oppressive
discrimination between tangibles and intangibles.
Two years later First Nat'l Bank v. Maine 5s reaffirmed the limitation of death duty impositions on intangibles to only one state that of the decedent owner. 58 The property transferred in this case
was corporate stock; the state of incorporation was considered as
having no jurisdiction to impose a death tax, since the decedent
owner was domiciled elsewhere. The Court reasoned that the transmission of intangible personal property, like tangible personal property, from the dead to the living can take place in but one state.
Jurisdiction to tax this event exists only in the state of the domicile
of the owner because of the application of the maxim mobilia sequuntur personam. The decision in this case was the fourth within
a period of three years in which a majority of the Court took a positive position against death taxation of intangibles by more than one
state.
The restrictive attitude of the Court toward the power of states
to impose death taxes on intangibles was relaxed in 1989 when double
taxation was ruled constitutional in certain trust situations." 59 This
relaxation was augmented in 1942 when the Court did a complete
about-face in reaching its decision in State Tax Comm'n of Utah v.
1S5Farmers Loan and Trust Co. involved negotiable bonds and certificates of
indebtedness issued in a foreign state; Baldwin v. Missouri, 281 U.S. 586 (1930),
was concerned with notes secured by mortgages on Missouri lands, kept in Missouri
by the non-resident owner; Beidler v. South Carolina Tax Comm'n, 282 U.S. 1
(1930), had to do with an indebtedness owed by a corporation of that state to an
Illinois decedent who was the principal stockholder of the corporation. In all
three cases the due process clause of the 14th amendment was held to allow a
death tax by the domiciliary state of the decedent only.
"O6Farmers Loan and Trust Co. v. Minnesota, 280 U.S. 204 (1930).
'57284 U.S. 312 (1932).
2sIn this case and also in Farmers Loan and Trust Co. the Court noted the
possibility of stock acquiring a business situs outside the domiciliary state, with
the consequent non-applicability of the principle governing the two cases. The
Court, however, expressly refrained from dealing with such a situation, and the
subsequent decision reached in State Tax Comm'n of Utah v. Aldrich rendered the
question of double taxation in such a situation purely academic.
'59See notes 178, 179 infra and accompanying text.
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Aldrich.160 The owner of stock in a Utah corporation died a domiciliary of New York, where he had held the certificates representing
the shares. A death tax had been paid to New York; the Court was
presented the question whether Utah might also impose a death tax
on the transfer of the same intangible personal property. In answering in the affirmative the majority of the Court recognized the
right of the domiciliary state to impose a death tax but stated that
another state that had extended benefits or protection or could demonstrate the practical fact of its power or sovereignty over the shares of
stock might likewise constitutionally make its exaction. Utah, the
Court decided, could meet these requirements. Utah law defined
the nature and extent of the interest of the shareholders in the corporation; its law afforded protection for those rights. Utah had power
over the transfer by the corporation of its shares of stock, and any
freedom of transfer of the stock stemmed from Utah law. Thus
this protection, benefit, and power over the shares entitled Utah
to impose a death tax on the transfer of the stock.
The Court felt bound to allow double taxation in the Aldrich
situation in order to be consistent with its decisions allowing double
taxation in the trust situations faced three years previously. 161 In
order to do this First Nat'l Bank v. Maine was specifically overruled;
Blackstone v. Miller, which had been repudiated in 1930, was again
favorably embraced, and the long-time position of Justice Holmes
that there is no constitutional immunity from double taxation of the
transfer of intangibles at the death of the owner was vindicated.
INTANGIBLES

HELD IN TRUST

Property Taxes
The legal interest of the trustee in the trust res is distinct from the
equitable interest of the beneficiary; it is considered as a distinct right,
taxable as intangible personal property at the domicile of the trustee. 16 2 The tax situs may, but need not, be where the trust is
actively administered; it may be based on the mere fact that the
trustee is domiciled there and is accorded the advantages of the law
163
of his domicile.
160316 U.S. 174.
161See notes 178, 179 infra and accompanying text.
162Greenough v. Tax Assessors, 331 U.S. 486 (1947).
1631bid.
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The theory that the tax situs of intangibles held in trust may be
established by the mere fact of residence of the trustee was written
into the law in 1947 by a bare majority of the Court. 64 The Court
held that the domiciliary state of one of two trustees of a testamentary
trust consisting of shares of stock could impose an ad valorem property tax on one half the value of the corpus of the trust, even though
the administration of the trust was under the supervision of the courts
of another state, the other trustee and the beneficiary lived in that
state, and the evidences of the intangibles were located there. The
majority of the Court felt that such a holding was consistent with
the due process clause, since the domiciliary state of the legal owner,
the trustee, furnished benefits and protection to the trust res in spite
of its administration in another state. The Court noted that third
parties dealing with the trustee on trust matters would have to proceed against him directly as an individual, since he did not reside
in the state of the seat of the trust. The trustee might need the aid
of the law of his domicile to enforce trust claims against a resident of
the same state. He was as suable as any other obligor, even though
the trust was administered in another state. Thus the domiciliary
state of the trustee was rendering benefits for which a tax could be
imposed.
The dissenting justices did not agree that the mere fact of residence of a trustee in a state was a sufficiently substantial connection
between the trust res and the trustee to warrant a property tax. 6 5
They were unwilling to accept the majority's analysis that the benefits granted the trustee of the out-of-state trust by the law of his domicile were sufficient to support a tax situs for the trust property in
whole or in part. They also took note of the significant point that
even though only one half of the trust property was being taxed,
there was no reason under the majority holding why the entire trust
res could not be taxed by the state, since the resident trustee had no
power over, or title to, any fraction of the trust property that he
did not have over all of it.
Double Taxation. The fact that the laws of more than one state
are often involved in trust situations creates tax complexities. A
troublesome problem arises when the beneficiaries of the trust are
domiciled in a different state from that of the trustee and the state
164Ibid.
1651d. at 500.
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of domicile of the beneficiaries seeks to impose a tax. In Safe Deposit
and Trust Co. v. Virginia'66 the Court conceded to Maryland, the
domiciliary state of the trustee, jurisdiction to impose a property tax
on the whole corpus of the trust, consisting of stocks and bonds kept
by the trustee in that state. It held, however, that imposition of the
same kind of tax by Virginia, the domiciliary state of the beneficiaries,
would necessitate an improper application of the maxim mobilia
sequuntur personam and was prohibited by the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment.167
In this case the beneficiaries, two infant sons of the settlor, were
to receive none of the trust property, and would have no control over
it, until reaching the age of twenty-five years. If either son died
before his twenty-fifth birthday, distribution was to be made to his
issue or, in the absence of issue, to the survivor. The Court seemed
to draw a distinction between the value of the whole corpus of the
trust, as owned by the trustee, and the value of the beneficial interest.
This difference, as Justice Stone clarified in his concurring opinion,168
was founded on the contingency that one or both of the sons would
never acquire legal title because of death before reaching the age of
twenty-five. Consequently, the value of the whole corpus at the time
of the property tax levy apparently was assumed to be greater than
that of the equitable interests of the beneficiaries. The Court expressly pointed out that the power of Virginia to lay a tax upon the
fair value of an interest actually owned by one of her resident citizens was not in issue. Justice Holmes dissented.169 He could see no
reason for distinguishing between the amount of property legally
owned by the trustee and that equitably owned by the beneficiaries.
He concluded, therefore, that both Maryland and Virginia could impose property taxes consistent with the due process clause, since the
laws of each state provided benefits to the respective interests.
In 1941, twelve years after the Safe Deposit case, the Court affirmed without opinion a decision of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania 170 in which Pennsylvania was allowed to impose a property
166280 U.S. 83 (1929).
167Brooke v. City of Norfolk, 277 U.S. 27 (1928), presumably was decided on
the same basis. The state property tax invalidated was assessed to a life beneficiary
on a trust res consisting of intangibles. Both the trustee and the testator were
residents of another state, where the trust was administered.
168200 U.S. at 95.
1691d. at 96.

17oCommonwealth v. Stewart, 338 Pa. 9, 12 A.2d 444 (1940), aff'd, Stewart v.
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tax upon the equitable interest of a resident of that state in a New
York trust of intangibles. Curry v. McCanless1"1 and Graves v.
Elliott,172 cases in which multi-state death taxation of intangibles was

upheld, comprised the judicial justification for the Pennsylvania
action. Safe Deposit was distinguished on the ground that in that
case the attempt of the state of the beneficiary was to impose a tax
upon the full value of the property rather than upon the value of the
beneficial interest.
Curiously, Justice Holmes, who dissented in Safe Deposit by taking
the position that the domiciliary state of the beneficiary was entitled
under the Federal Constitution to impose a property tax on the
beneficial interest, apparently was of a different turn of mind in
1928. In Brooke v. City of Norfolk173 the beneficial interest of a Vir-

ginia resident who was a life beneficiary of a Maryland trust was held
not subject to what apparently was a Virginia property tax. The
opinion, written by Justice Holmes, is brief and lacks clarity, although
the prihcipal reliance was on Wachovia Bank and Trust Co. v.
4
Doughtony1
a 1926 case that was expressly overruled in 1942.175
A valid conclusion appears to be that the present position of the
Court is that the domiciliary state of the trustee, as well as that of
the beneficiary, may impose a property tax on intangibles held in
trust. The former may tax the entire corpus of the trust; the latter
may tax the beneficial interest. So far as the Court has expressed
itself, the values of the two interests are not the same, at least not
in all cases. Some commentators 7 6 have taken the position that
the Safe Deposit and Trust Co. case was overruled by Curry v.
McCanless and Graves v. Elliott. This conclusion seems to be warranted only if the value of the legal property interest owned by the
trustee is the same as that of the equitable interest owned by the
beneficiary, as was contended by Justice Holmes in his dissent in
Safe Deposit. To what extent the Court will go in distinguishing
between the value of the two interests remains to be seen.

Pennsylvania, 312 U.S. 649 (1941).
27lSee note 178 infra and accompanying text.
172See note 179 infra and accompanying text.
173277 U.S. 27 (1928).
174272 U.S. 567.
MGraves v. Schmidlapp, 315 U.S. 657.
l76See Morton & Cotton, Limitations on State Jurisdiction to Levy Death
Taxes, 5 MIAMI L.Q. 449 (1951).
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Death Taxes
The history of death taxation of intangibles held in trust, unlike
that of property taxation, reveals no deviation by the Court from the
principle that any state that renders benefits to the intangibles may
impose a death duty. In 1916 a death tax by Wisconsin was sustained
upon securities held in trust in Illinois with reference to which the
Wisconsin decedent was a life beneficiary and the holder of a power
7
of appointment.7
In 1939 the Court rendered two decisions on the same day which
involved the issue of multi-state death taxation of intangibles held
in trust. In Curry v. McCanless178 the decedent, a resident of Tennessee, had transferred securities in trust to an Alabama trustee and reserved the power to dispose of the trust corpus by will. The settlor
died, leaving a will disposing of the securities, a taxable event under
Tennessee law. In Graves v. Elliott" 9 the decedent settlor created a
revocable trust of intangibles to be administered in Colorado. The
settlor died domiciled in New York without revoking the trust.180
In both cases the Court was called upon to decide the constitutionality of death taxes imposed by the domiciliary states of the
settlors, Tennessee and New York. The majority of the Court sustained the taxes imposed by these states and also held that the
states in which the trustees were domiciled and in which the trusts
were administered might impose death taxes on the intangibles held
in trust. A degree of inconsistency was recognized between this conclusion and the decisions of 1930181 in which multi-state death taxation of non-trust intangibles was disallowed, but the latter decisions
2
were considered by the Court to be of limited application.'8
177Bullen v. Wisconsin, 240 U.S. 625. See note 185 infra and accompanying
text concerning the Court's 1942 view of the 1926 case of Wachovia Bank and
Trust Co. v. Doughton. In that case the laws of the domiciliary state of the decedent, who had exercised a power of appointment with reference to intangibles
held in trust in another state, rendered no benefits that would warrant the imposition of a death tax.
178307 U.S. 357 (1939).

-79307 U.S. 383 (1939).
IsoPearson v. McGraw, 308 U.S. 313 (1939), held that when a settlor of a
trust consisting of intangibles transfers the property to an out-of-state trustee in
contemplation of the settlor's death, the domiciliary state of the settlor may impose

a death duty upon the happening of that event.
1siSee note 155 supra.
182The 1930 decisions were overruled in 1942.
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In these trust situations the Court was of the opinion that due
process of law does not require the fixing of a single, exclusive place
for death taxation of intangibles if two distinct sets of legal relationships have been created that involve protection of the laws of two
states. The legal ownership of intangibles in the domiciliary state of
the trustee is deemed an adequate basis for imposition of a death
tax by that state. On the other hand, the benefits accorded by the
law of the settlor's domicile, by virtue of which he exercises or may
exercise a power over intangibles, furnish an adequate basis for the
imposition of a death tax on the intangibles. Thus the doctrine that
the fourteenth amendment precludes a death tax on any interest in
the same intangibles in more than one state, which had been applied
by the Court four times from 1930 to 1932183 in non-trust situations,
was expressly held not applicable in trust situations.
In 1942 the Court was afforded the opportunity to test the strength
of its conviction that the course it was following concerning trust
property was the proper one. In Graves v. Schmidlapp'84 a Massachusetts decedent left property in trust to Massachusetts trustees, with
direction to pay the income to his son for life and with a general
power in the life beneficiary to appoint by will. The son died domiciled in New York, where he had exercised the power by a will admitted to probate there. New York levied a death tax against the
donee's estate, including in the gross estate the property appointed
under the exercise of the power.
The Court thus was faced with a situation similar to that presented
in 1926 in Wachovia Bank and Trust Co. v. Doughton, s 5 in which
the state of the donee's domicile was held to be without power to
levy a death tax on the appointed property because the trust assets
had no tax situs in that state and because under Massachusetts law
the appointee takes from the donor rather than the donee. This type
of reasoning no longer favorably impressed the Court, however. In
addition to the legal relationship of Massachusetts law to the appointed property, the law of the donee's domiciliary state, New York,
applied with equal clarity for two reasons: (1) the right to appoint
the intangible was property in the donee's hands where he was domiciled, and such disposition furnished a proper occasion for a death
tax no less than on the transfer of property that he fully owned; (2)
ls3See notes 154-57 supra.
184315 U.S. 657 (1942).
285272 U.S. 567.
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regardless of how the power might have been exercised, it was in fact
executed by a will probated in the donee's domiciliary state, thus
entitling the transfer to the protection and benefit of the law of that
state. The express overruling of the Wachovia case was the natural
result of this reasoning. The Court thereby exhibited a fortified
conviction that there is no constitutional prohibition of multi-state
death taxation of intangibles held in trust if more than one state is
lending benefits to the intangibles through relationships to the owner
or to the property itself. There has been no retreat from this position
to date.
PART IV. PRIVILEGES

A state may impose a tax for the privilege of engaging in an
activity within its borders.186 Taxable activities are numerous and
varied. They may consist of various privileges, such as operating
s7
using an article,1 8
under a franchise as a domestic corporation,
1 9
engaging in an occupation,
receiving income, 90 selling goods,' 9'
92
using goods,' and a multitude of others. The exercise of the taxable
privilege need produce nothing of substantial value. The mere
formality of creating an instrument within the state, even though no
93
rights arise therefrom, has been held to be a taxable activity.1

The tax on a privilege is classified as an excise tax.194 One excise,
the death tax, has already been considered in this article. This tax,
18;Norton

Co. v.

Department of Revenue

of Illinois,

340 U.S. 534

(1951).

A privilege secured by the Constitution, such as the right of free speech or the
right of intercourse among the states, may not be taxed by the state. Murdock
v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943).
S7,Detroit Internat'l Bridge Co. v. Corporation Tax Appeal Bd., 294 U.S. 83

(1935).
18SE.g., Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., 300 U.S. 577 (1937).
9

18 Cooney v. Mountain States Tel. 9: Tel. Co., 294 U.S. 384 (1935).
19oNew York ex rel. Cohn v. Graves, 300 U.S. 308 (1937).
19'McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co., 309 U.S. 33 (1940).
192Eastern Air Transport, Inc. v. South Carolina Tax Comm'n, 285 U.S. 147

(1932).
193Graniteville Mfg. Co. v. Query, 283 U.S. 376 (1931).
394Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107 (1911). The term franchise tax is
sometimes used, e.g., International Harvester Co. v. Evatt, 329 U.S. 416 (1947),
and is particularly meaningful in the case of a corporation existing under the
laws of a particular state. Detroit Internat'l Bridge Co. v. Corporation Tax
Appeal Bd., 294 U.S. 83 (1935); Cornell Steamboat Co. v. Sohmer, 235 U.S. 549
(1915). The use of the term should be accepted with caution, however, since at
times it has been construed to be concerned, in a particular situation, with a
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which is on the receipt or transfer of property at death, 9 5 is so intimately associated with the property received and transferred that
the law governing its imposition has been dictated largely by principles emanating from the law of property taxation, 96 or from consideration of the nature of the property received or transferred. 197 A
treatment of death taxes in connection with property taxes, therefore,
is considered appropriate, even though property tax principles are
applicable with reference to some other excises.
In determining whether a privilege tax is within the constitutional
power of a state, the Court professes to look at the operating incidence
of the tax rather than the descriptive label that may be attached to
it by a state court. 98 This incidence or taxable event must be within
the boundaries of the state in order for the tax to be valid. 99 If it
occurs outside the state, the tax is inconsistent with due process of
2 00
law.
The Court has often been called upon to decide whether a taxable
event was created by activities that were carried on within a state
by a corporation engaged in interstate commerce.20 ' In its quest for
the solution of the problem, deference has been accorded the wellestablished principle that the commerce clause of the Federal Constitution prohibits a state tax for the privilege of engaging in interstate
commerce. 202 The Court has found, however, that in some situations
a taxable event can be created within a state in spite of the fact that
the corporation's business is of an interstate character.203 When this
takes place the due process of law clause, which governs jurisdiction
to tax, and the commerce clause, which protects interstate commerce,
tax on property and hence is a property, rather than an excise, tax. E.g., Railway
Express Agency v. Virginia, 358 U.S. 434 (1959). The same is true of a "capital
stock" tax. Pullman's Palace Car v. Pennsylvania, 141 U.S. 18 (1891).
195New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345 (1921).
196Frick v. Pennsylvania, 268 U.S. 473 (1925).
197Curry v. McCanless, 307 U.S. 357 (1939).
'OSlnternational Harvester Co. v. Wisconsin Dep't of Taxation, 322 U.S. 435
(1944); Wisconsin v. J. C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435 (1944); cf. McLeod v. J. E.
Dilworth Co., 322 U.S. 327 (1944), in which the Court apparently deviated from
this well-established principle.
199McLeod v. J. E. Dilworth Co., 322 U.S. 327 (1944).
200Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 303 U.S. 77 (1938).
201E.g., Nippert v. City of Richmond, 327 U.S. 416 (1946); Coverdale v. Arkansas-Louisiana Pipe Lifte Co., 303 U.S. 604 (1938).
202Atlantic and Pac. Tel. Co. v. Philadelphia, 190 U.S. 160 (1903).
203See McGoldrick v. Felt & Tarrant Mfg. Co., 309 U.S. 70 (1940), and cases
cited therein.
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play separate but intimately associated roles. Illustrations of the
interplay between these two important constitutional provisions will
be discussed with reference to some of the privileges the taxation of
which has been subjected to frequent judicial consideration.
THE PRIVILEGE OF DOING BUSINESS

Intra-stateAspects of Interstate Business
A state may impose a tax for the privilege of engaging in a local
business or occupation even though the local activities are mingled
with interstate business. The tax, however, must not extend beyond
the domestic aspects of the business.204 Occupations such as generation of electrical energy, 205 mining of iron ore,20 6 and production of
natural gas 20 7 involve processes essentially local in character and are

taxable, though the resultant products are immediately put into the
stream of interstate commerce.
City of Chicago v. Willett Co. 20 8 is an interesting example of

taxation of the intra-state aspect of an interstate business. A Chicago
corporation's fleet of trucks was employed in an inseparable, commingled interstate and intra-state business by the daily transportation, in the same trucks, of goods destined for points inside Chicago
and for other points outside the State of Illinois. Chicago imposed
a graduated annual license tax on the corporation, varying in amount
with the size of each truck and proportioned so as not to be a burden
on interstate commerce. The Court upheld the tax, reasoning that
the corporation's business was so intimately associated with the City
of Chicago that it and the trucks, even though not confined to that
city, had acquired a permanent situs there. The operation of the
trucks was localized to the extent that it could be taxed by virtue
of a formula that left the interstate part of the business untaxed.
The Court's opinion in this case is illustrative of the casual manner
in which it has treated the aspects of tax jurisdiction in situations
involving interstate commerce. The commerce clause was given express and exclusive consideration, but when the Court dealt with
2O4Raley & Brothers v. Richardson, 264 U.S. 157 (1924); Postal Telegraph-Cable
Co. v. City of Fremont, 255 U.S. 124 (1921).
2o5Utah Power & Light Co. v. Pfost, 286 U.S. 165 (1932).
2o6Oliver Iron Mining Co. v. Lord, 262 U.S. 172 (1923).
2
o7iope Natural Gas Co. v. Hall, 274 U.S. 284 (1927).
208344 U.S. 574 (1953).
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localization of the intra-state business in order to render it taxable,
tacit recognition was given to the requirements of due process of law.
If the local activity is such an integral part of the interstate
process that it cannot realistically be separated from the multi-state
commerce, no tax may be imposed on it. Michigan-Wisconsin Pipe
Line Co. v. Calvert20 9 is in point. A tax was imposed upon the privilege of taking gas from an outlet of a local gasoline plant into the
connecting pipes of an interstate pipeline company after production
and processing had been accomplished. The Court ruled the tax
unconstitutional as a burden on interstate commerce because the
interstate transit had begun. The significant point was made that a
local aspect of interstate transportation cannot be carved from an
integral economic process; the attempt was but legislative whimsy.
The Court, although primarily concerned with the requirements
of the commerce clause, did not overlook the due process clause.
Much had been made by the taxing state of the benefits and protection that its laws afforded pipe line companies. The Court conceded this point but stated that such benefits were relevant only to
show that the essential requirements of due process had been sufficiently met to justify the imposition of tax on the interstate activity.
The Court pointed out that the challenge to the tax was not under
the due process clause but under the different considerations of the
commerce clause. Thus recognition was given to* the fact that even
though an activity may be localized to such an extent that a state's
jurisdiction to tax under the due process clause is not questioned,
still jurisdiction may not be exercised if the commerce clause will
be violated.
Interstate Solicitation of Business
When the activities of a domiciliary of one state are extended
into another, determination of the existence of a taxable event in
the non-domiciliary state is attended by difficulties. Such activities
on the part of corporations have given rise to a plethora of problems
for the Court.
A familiar situation in this field of excise tax law is that of the
itinerant salesman or "drummer" who sells goods for subsequent
delivery by his out-of-state employer. As early as 1887, in Robbins
v. Shelby County Taxing Dist.,210 the Court decided that a tax for
209347

U.S. 157 (1954).

210120 U.S. 489.
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the mere privilege of soliciting orders prior to their interstate shipment was prohibited by the commerce clause as a burden on interstate commerce. Many decisions to the same effect have followed this
landmark case, 21 1 culminating in 1957 in West Point Wholesale Grocery Co. v. City of Opelika.212 A Georgia wholesale grocery corporation solicited business within an Alabama municipality. The orders
were transferred to its place of business in Georgia, and delivery of
the goods was made to the buyers by truck. The Alabama municipality's flat-sum privilege tax, levied on all out-of-city wholesale
grocers delivering goods within the city, was declared unconstitutional
as placing a direct burden on the interstate business of the Georgia
wholesaler.
It is of significance to note that the "drummer" cases were not
decided on the basis of the due process clause. The activity of soliciting orders certainly furnishes a taxable event in so far as the due
process clause is concerned. Again, however, the commerce clause is
the constitutional factor prohibiting the state's exercise of such jurisdiction.
The itinerant salesman does not always fall into the "drummer"
classification. If he carries goods with him for immediate delivery,
he is in the category of a "peddler" and as such is engaged in the
exercise of a local, taxable privilege. 2 13 The same is true of the
peddler's modern counterpart, the foreign corporation that carries on
sales activities in a non-domiciliary state in a manner devised to gain
the advantage of a business outlet in that state. 21 4 Thus the maintenance of a branch office and warehouse in a non-domiciliary state,
from which local sales were made and from which orders were solicited and received for out-of-state acceptance and shipment, was
considered to form a nexus between the corporation's activities and
the non-domicilary state, so that a taxable event was created within
21 5
that state.
211E.g., Nippert v. City of Richmond, 327 U.S. 416 (1946); Real Silk Hosiery
Mills v. Portland, 268 U.S. 325 (1925); Stockard v. Morgan, 185 U.S. 27 (1902);
Brennan v. Titusville, 153 U.S. 289 (1894).
212354 U.S. 390.
213Welton v. Missouri, 91 U.S. 275 (1875); Walling v. Michigan, 116 U.S. 446
(1886).
2
14Norton Co. v. Department of Revenue of Illinois, 340 U.S. 534 (1951);
Dalton Adding Machine Co. v. Virginia ex rel. State Corp. Comm'n, 246 U.S.
498 (1918); Singer Sewing Machine Co. v. Brickell, 233 U.S. 304 (1914).
25
1 Norton Co. v. Department of Revenue of Illinois, supra note 214; see Armstrong v. City of Tampa, 112 So. 2d 293 (Fla. 1959), in which the activities alone,
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In view of the fact that the commerce clause and the due process
of law clause are so closely related in the "peddler" type situation,
it seems desirable to note certain distinctive premises apparently
underlying the reasoning in the cases. The commerce clause will
render the interstate occupation of itinerant selling immune from
state taxation unless the incident upon which the tax operates is
some local activity or event considered to be separate and distinct
from the actual flow of interstate commerce. When the peddler
carries goods with him for sale and immediate delivery he thereby
localizes the activity of selling and satisfies the commerce clause.
The same is true of the foreign corporation when it maintains within
the non-domiciliary state a branch office and warehouse and carries
on substantial sales activities in connection therewith.
The due process clause is more easily satisfied than the commerce
clause in these situations. The benefits of the law of the non-domiciliary state are accorded an out-of-state peddler and a foreign corporation when solicitations are'made by the peddler and the corporation's representative in the non-domiciliary state. The mere solicitation of orders constitutes a taxable event and thus establishes jurisdiction to tax, making unnecessary, for due process purposes, the
presence of the additional factors required by the commerce clause.
The right to exercise this jurisdiction, although established, now depends on whether any valid objection can rest on the commerce clause.
Unless the taxable event is brought into existence in such a manner
that the commerce clause is satisfied, no tax can be imposed, regardless of conformity to the due process clause. The all-important issue,
therefore, is whether the activity in a particular case is one that is
sufficiently severable from interstate commerce to constitute a taxable
event. Such an issue, resolvable only by careful consideration of the
facts of each case, is an open invitation to controversy and litigation.
PRIVILEGES IN CONNECrION WITH INTERSTATE COMMODITIES

A preceding phase of this discussion was concerned with the development of case law in regard to property taxation and commodities in the stream of interstate commerce.2 1 6 In that context the commodities were found to be immune from taxation as long as they
remained in the stream of interstate transit. At other times, however,
unsupported by the presence of a branch office and a warehouse, were considered
,of such a substantial nature that a taxable event was created.
21OSee Pt. II supra, subheading " (b). Commodities."
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this property was considered taxable, namely, during stages preparatory to its entry into the stream of commerce, during an interruption
in the interstate journey if the interruption was for the independent
advantage of the owner rather than a mere incident of the interstate
transportation, and after the interstate movement had terminated.
The law regarding taxation of privileges related to commodities
that have been, are presently, or soon will be, in the stream of interstate commerce has developed along lines similar to those of property
taxation. Accordingly, excise taxes for the privilege of manufacturing,
217
processing or otherwise preparing goods before interstate shipment,
storing, withdrawing from storage, using the goods for the benefit of
the owner during an interruption in the interstate trip, 218 and for
dealing with such commodities after the interstate journey comes to
an end219 have been upheld.
Once the commerce clause is rendered inoperative by virtue of
interruption of the interstate transit, or by its termination, the requirements for satisfying the due process clause with reference to an
excise tax are not subject to the critical comments leveled at the imposition of a property tax. As indicated previously, 220 the Court, in upholding a property tax in these two situations, has not seemed sufficiently concerned with requiring the degree of permanency of location
that it has specified for the establishment of a tax situs for tangibles
in other situations. The assumption seems to have been that if the
commerce clause no longer immunizes the tangibles from property
taxation, the requirements of due process are also satisfied.
No such assumption is necessary with reference to an excise tax
imposed for the exercise of a privilege in connection with tangibles
recently released from the stream of interstate commerce. Since
217E.g., Chassaniol v. City of Greenwood, 291 U.S. 584 (1934); Federal Compress
& Whse. Co. v. McLean, 291 U.S. 17 (1934); Utah Power & Light Co. v. Pfost, 286
U.S. 165 (1932).
218E.g., Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Gallagher, 306 U.S. 182 (1939); Southern Pac.
Co. v. Gallagher, 306 U.S. 167 (1939); Edelman v. Boeing Air Transport, Inc.,
289 U.S. 249 (1933); Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Wallace, 288 U.S. 249 (1933).
219E.g., Caskey Baking Co. v. Virginia, 313 U.S. 117 (1941); Browning v. City
of Waycross, 233 U.S. 16 (1914); Armour Packing Co. v. Lacy, 200 U.S. 226 (1906).
220See Pt. II supra, subheading " (b). Commodities." This comment, no doubt,
has applicability to tangibles that have never been connected with interstate
commerce, but it can have no reference to tangibles as the subject of death
taxes, since the Court has required a permanent situs for the tangibles as a
prerequisite for the imposition of a valid death tax. See discussion in Pt. II
supra under heading "Death Taxes."
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an excise tax is concerned with a privilege as the incidence of the
tax rather than the property that may be involved in the exercise
of the privilege, there seems no justifiable reason for concern over
the question of the tax situs of property for purposes of determining
the validity of an excise tax.
RECEIPT OF INCOME

The receipt of income by a resident of a taxing sovereignty is
221
Domicile itself affords a
universally recognized as a taxable event.

basis for such taxation. Enjoyment of the privileges of residence in
the state and the attendant right to invoke the protection of its laws
are inseparable from responsibility for sharing the costs of government.2 22 These privileges bear a direct relationship to the economic

advantage realized by the receipt of income and the power to control
it. 2 2 3

Neither the privilege nor the burden of receiving income is affected
by the character of the source from which the income is derived. For
this reason income is not necessarily clothed with the tax immunity
enjoyed by its source.2 2 4 A state may tax its residents upon net income
from a business located wholly without the state and beyond its
taxing power.2 2 5 It may tax a domiciliary beneficiary's net income
22 6
alfrom bonds held in trust and administered in another state,
taxed
be
can
bonds
the
of
value
entire
the
that
doubtful
is
though it
22 7
It may
by the beneficiary's domiciliary state to the same extent.
although
commerce,
interstate
in
operations
from
income
tax the net
a tax on the commerce is forbidden.2 2 8 This holding has been applied
to domestic corporations, 22 9 to foreign corporations having a commercial domicile within the taxing state,230 and to foreign corpora221New York ex rel. Cohn v. Graves, 300 U.S. 308 (1937).
2221bid.
223See Virginia v. Imperial Coal Sales Co., 293 U.S.

15 (1934); Lawrence v.
State Tax Comm'n of Miss., 286 U.S. 276 (1932); Maguire v. Trefry, 253 U.S.
12 (1920).
224New York ex rel. Cohn v.. Graves, 300 U.S. 308 (1937).
225Lawrence v. State Tax Comm'n of Miss., 286 U.S. 276 (1932).
226Maguire v. Trefry, 253 U.S. 12 (1920).
22
7See note 166 supra and accompanying text.
22sUnited States Glue Co. v. Town of Oak Creek, 247 U.S. 321 (1918).
2251bid.
230Memphis Natural Gas Co. v. Beeler, 315 U.S. 649 (1942); Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain, 254 U.S. 113 (1920).
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tions not incorporated or not having their principal place of business
in the taxing state but carrying on substantial local activities there.2 1
It is evident that jurisdiction to tax the receipt of income is
governed by different principles from those governing the taxation
of property. The incidence of a tax on the receipt of income differs
from that of a property tax. One is on the privilege of receiving;
the other is on the property itself.2 3 2 A tax on both, whether by the

same or different states, does not constitute double taxation.33 Accordingly, the Court has assumed the position that the due process
clause should not be extended to mean that because a state is prohibited from taxing property that it neither protects nor controls, it
is likewise prohibited from taxing the receipt and command of income
from the property by its resident, who is subject to its control and
enjoys the benefits of its laws234

State jurisdiction to tax the receipt of income is not limited to
the domiciliary state even when property is not the source of the
income. Due process of law has been held to contemplate a state's
jurisdiction to levy a tax on the income of a non-resident that is
attributable to his activities within the taxing state.23 5 In so holding
the Court was impressed by the pertinence of some of the fundamental
principles of tax law mentioned here. In this country the states have
the power normally pertaining to governments to resort to all reasonable forms of taxation in order to defray governmental expenses. In
so doing they are not limited to property taxation or to any particular form of excise. A state from whose laws property, business,
and industry derive the protection and security without which production and gainful occupation would be impossible should not be
barred from exacting a share of those gains in the form of income
taxes for the support of the government. Thus the Court justified
establishment of the jurisdiction of a non-domiciliary state to impose
a tax on the receipt of income earned in that state.
In the companion cases of Northwestern States Portland Cement

Co. v. Minnesota and Williams v. Stockham Valves & Fittings, Inc., 236
decided in 1959, the Court judicially augmented the jurisdiction of
23lNorfolk & W.R.R. v. North Carolina, 297 U.S. 682 (1936); Bass, Ratcliff &
Gretton, Ltd. v. State Tax Comm'n, 266 U.S. 271 (1924).
232New York ex ret. Cohn v. Graves, 300 U.S. 308 (1937).
233lbid.
234Ibid.
235Shaffer v. Carter, 252 U.S. 37 (1920).

23C358 U.S. 450.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol13/iss4/1

48

Clark: A State's Tax Jurisdiction as Limited by the United States Consti
JURISDICTION TO TAX
a non-domiciliary state to tax the receipt of income. The principle
was laid down that net income from the interstate operations of a
foreign corporation may be subjected to state taxation by a nondomiciliary state if the levy is not discriminatory and is properly
apportioned to local activities within the taxing state that form a
nexus sufficient to support the tax. The taxes in both cases were
concededly non-discriminatory and fairly apportioned. The objections
to the taxes were grounded on the commerce clause 237 and the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
In the Northwestern States case an Iowa corporation was engaged
in the manufacture and sale of cement at its plant in Iowa about
forty miles from the Minnesota border. The corporation regularly
and systematically, solicited orders in Minnesota. Each order was subject to acceptance by and delivery from the company's plant in Iowa.
Sales were made only to dealers, and forty-eight per cent of the corporation's entire sales were made to Minnesota dealers. The corporation maintained a sales office in Minnesota under the supervision of
a salesman. Two other salesmen and a secretary occupied this threeroom office, and two more salesmen used it as a clearing house. The
corporation maintained no bank account in Minnesota, owned no
real estate, and warehoused no merchandise there. All sales were made
on a delivered-price basis fixed in Iowa; no pick-ups were allowed
at its plant. Minnesota orders were transmitted to the Iowa headquarters. Salesmen also took orders for local dealers, who in turn
placed the orders with the corporation, to be filled in the regular
manner. In addition, salesmen received and transmitted claims against
238
the corporation for loss or damage in shipment of goods.
In upholding Minnesota's jurisdiction to tax, the Court was concerned with the objection based on the due process of law clause.
Notice was accorded the fact that taxes were levied only on that
portion of the taxpayer's net income that arose from its activities
within the taxing state. Consideration was then given to the substantial income-producing character of the local activities that were
carried on by the corporation in this non-domiciliary state. These
activities were considered to be of such a nature as to form a nexus
betw.een the tax and the transaction within the state. Thus Minnesota was said to be rendering opportunities, protection, and benefits
237U.S. CoNsr. art. I, §8, cl. 3.
23S8The factual situation of the Williams case is not included in the text because
of its similarity to that of the Northwestern case.
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for which a tax could be imposed in conformity with due process of
law. The Court found that the commerce clause did not prohibit
such a tax. On the contrary, some of its prior decisions pointed logically to the Northwestern holding by recognizing the doctrine that
the entire net income of a corporation, generated by interstate as
well as intra-state activities, may be fairly apportioned among the
states for tax purposes by formulae utilizing in-state aspects of interstate affairs.239
Three dissenting justices purported to base their differences with
the majority on its construction of the commerce clause.240 They
reasoned that the pertinent decisions of the Court allow a state to
impose an apportioned net income tax when interstate commerce is
involved only if there is a definite intra-state incident within the
taxing state in the unitary process. The income from the intra-state
business can be taxed, but taxation of income from purely interstate
commerce is prohibited by the commerce clause. The dissenters concluded that the factual situation presented only the taxation of interstate commerce. Implicit in the reasoning of the dissent is the assumption that the activities of the Iowa corporation carried on in
Minnesota did not constitute intra-state business; consequently, there
was no adequate basis for the tax. On the other hand, the majority
apparently was satisfied with requiring less in respect to corporate
activity within the state than it had previously required as a basis for
imposition of an apportioned net income tax when all of the activities were in furtherance of interstate commerce.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, in one of the dissenting opinions,241 expressed apprehension with respect to the practical results of the
liberal treatment accorded the states by the majority of the Court.
His expectancy was that every state that had not already done so
would devise a formula of apportionment to tax the income of
enterprises carrying on interstate commerce; commerce would not be
burdened hypothetically but practically. In addition, thousands of
small or moderate-sized corporations would be forced into a multitude of expenditures in order to meet the diverse and variegated
tax laws of all the states. The cost of complying with the requirements of the different states, reasoned Justice Frankfurter, might well
239The same is true of gross receipts from an interstate enterprise.
R.R. v. Rogan, 340 U.S. 511 (1951).

Canton

240358 U.S. 450 at 477.
241Id. at 470.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol13/iss4/1

50

Clark: A State's Tax Jurisdiction as Limited by the United States Consti
JURISDICTION TO TAX

exceed the burden of the taxes. In his opinion the Congress, not the
Court, was the proper body to deal with problems of accommodating
federal and state fiscal needs.
Justice Frankfurter's opinion was accurately prophetic, at least
in part. Since the decision was issued three states have amended
their tax laws in order to take advantage of the latitude granted
them.24 2 Federal legislation has also been enacted. In September
1959 executive approval was given to an act of Congress 24 3 that qualified the operation of the Northwestern and Williams decisions. The
law sets up a standard of minimum activity which protects out-of-state
businesses from income taxation in situations similar to these. Generally, an out-of-state business may (1) solicit orders for tangible personal property within a state, subject to approval or rejection and
shipment or delivery from outside the state; (2) solicit orders within
a state in the name of or for the benefit of a prospective dealer-customer if they are placed with the out-of-state business to be filled
and delivered; and (3) use independent contractors such as commission agents or brokers, even those with offices within the taxing
state, to solicit and accept orders. Presumably immunity from state
net income taxation under the new law is not available if the business activities in the taxing state are not limited to those permitted.
For example, the maintenance of a warehouse or stock of goods within the state apparently will cause forfeiture of immunity.
The Northwestern and Williams cases were not concerned with
the extent to which the domiciliary state may impose a tax on the
net income of her corporations that derive their income from interstate commerce. These decisions allow a non-domiciliary state to tax
a portion of the income. Then what is the right of the domiciliary
state? At present the Court is of the opinion that a state may tax
the entire income of an individual domiciled there, even though the
income is derived entirely from property or activities outside the
state and therefore is subject to a tax at its source. 244 To this extent
2 45
double taxation of income by the states has been approved.
Whether the Court will approve of double taxation in interstate commerce situations, now that the way has been made easier for the
242Idaho, Utah, and Tenn.; see Studenski, State Taxation of Interstate Commerce, 20 Tax Review No. 7 (July 1959).
24315 U.S.C. §381 (Supp. I, 1959).
244New York ex tel. Cohn v. Graves, 300 U.S. 308 (1937); Lawrence v. State
Tax Comm'n, 286 U.S. 276 (1932).
245See note 244 supra.
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non-domiciliary state to impose an apportioned net income tax, remains a matter of speculation.
PART V.

CONCLUSION

A study of the case law of a state's jurisdiction to tax under the
Federal Constitution reveals unabated controversy. A divided Court
has been the rule rather than the exception in the momentous cases.
Two reasons for the frequent lack of a unanimous decision stand out.
First, no provision of the Constitution specifically outlines this important phase of a state's sovereignty. Consequently, the Court has
found its only constitutional guide to a solution of these problems in
the general due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. With
very little to point the way, the Court has been forced to adopt
operating principles based on what it considered at the time to be
desirable policies. These policies have been born of the various
and conflicting philosophies of the personnel of the Court. As the
personnel changed the prevailing philosophies tended to vary, and in
some cases the law followed suit. Second, jurisdiction to tax demands
a subject upon which the tax is to operate. The nature of this subject
has been the basis of many of the differences of opinion among the
members of the Court with reference to determination of the taxability of the subject. Much of the divergence of opinion in regard
to the location of a tax situs stems from conflicting views of where
property and privileges are located for tax purposes.
These two reasons have not operated independently. Tangibles
are taxable where they are permanently located and nowhere else.
The nature of the property apparently has been the most important
factor in making possible the implementation of this principle, since
it is reasonably adaptable to localization. On the other hand, the
nature of intangibles has proved more disturbing to a vacillating
Court. Even judicial distaste for double taxation has proved insufficient to justify continued adherence to the Court's reasoning of the
early 1930's whereby the peculiar characteristics of intangibles were
ignored to the extent that the situs of the property was deemed to
be in a single state. The present position, therefore, leaves the states
to fend for themselves in preventing double taxation with reference
to intangibles. They seem to be accomplishing this as they see fit
through reciprocal exemption legislation.
At present there seems to be a lull in the Court's treatment of the
double-taxation area, but litigation may be expected as long as the
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fourteenth amendment is construed to prohibit double taxation
of tangibles and allow such taxation of intangibles. This is true regardless of recognized differences in the nature of various types of
property. The advantages accorded by a state to its domiciliary owner
of property are difficult to distinguish satisfactorily on the basis of
the nature and location of property he owns; taxation of tangibles
upon the assumption that these advantages have ceased because of
the location of the property outside the domiciliary state is unrealistic.
The concession should be made, and adhered to, that any decision
with reference to the acceptability of double taxation is basically
one of policy. The adopted policy should be one that contemplates
similar treatment of tangibles and intangibles. The availability of
acceptable legal reasoning in support of either allowing or disallowing
double taxation should cause little concern to the Court, since both
positions have been assumed at one time or another. Dissimilarity
of treatment would probably have greater repercussions if it were
not for the fact that states have passed the previously mentioned
reciprocal exemption legislation.
Scientific developments portend a continuation of problems involving the tax jurisdiction of a state. Novel situations in the wake
of these developments will give rise to questions of tax situs not yet
faced by the Court. In addition, interstate commerce invites the use
of ingenuity in seeking judicial enlargement of a state's power to
obtain revenue from a lucrative source. The -Court's reactions will
be interesting and probably not always welcome. Additional congressional curbs may be deemed necessary. Whatever the future may
produce, the Court may deal with it without being bound by wellestablished precedent in so far as a state's jurisdiction is concerned.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1960

53

Florida Law Review, Vol. 13, Iss. 4 [1960], Art. 1
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW
TABLE OF HEADINGS AND SUBHEADINGS

Part I.

Real Property ......

.............

404

Part II. Tangible Personal Property ...
.........
Property Taxes .
.
. .
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
. .
.
The Tax Situs .......
..............
Permanency of Location .....
...........
Tangibles in Interstate Commerce ........
(a). Instrumentalities .....
...........
The Doctrine of Apportionment ..
.......
The Effect of Apportionment on the Domiciliary State
The Role of Apportionment in Foreign Commerce .
-n-,nm
n
The Formula for Equitable I I' t ll-1 LIVAJAU
I L .....
(b). Commodities ..
......
Double Taxation ..
.......
Death Taxes ...
.........

406
406
406
407
408
409
410
415
417
417
418
421
424

Part III. Intangible Personal Property .
Property Taxes ...
........
Business Situs ...
........
The Corporate Domicile .......
Double Taxation ..
.......
Death Taxes ...
.........
Double Taxation ..
.......
Intangibles Held in Trust .
.....
Property Taxes
.......
Double Taxation .
......
Death Taxes ...
........

426
426
427
429
429
431
432
434
434
435
438

Part IV.

Privileges ...

.

.

........

The'Privilege of Doing Business .

.

..

Intra-state Aspects of Interstate Business .
Interstate Solicitation of Business . . .
Privileges in Connection with Interstate Commodi ties ..
Receipt of Income ........
Part V.

Conclusion .

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol13/iss4/1

P

.

....

V ......

440
442
442
443
445
447
452

54

